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an interesting SiTOR-FEC log

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Egyptian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for their communications mostly use:
- SiTOR ARQ 100/170 (offset 1700Hz)
- Codan 80bd chirp mode (offset 1500Hz)
- Codan 9001/3012 16 tone 75Bd QPSK (offset 1500Hz)
but it's not rare to spot short
diplomatic cables sent using SiTOR-FEC, after the usual SiTOR-ARQ:
 
16023.0 ---: MFA Cairo, EGY 0739 USB (cf +1700Hz) SiTOR ARQ 100Bd/170 calling OOVC(New Delhi Embassy), then into SiTOR-FEC 100Bd/170


 

'Arcotel MARS 2400' and 'THALES TRC-1752': same PSK-8 2400Bd, same 468 bits ACF, but two different waveforms

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Single tone PSK-8/2400Bd waveforms are very common and it'seasy to get mistakesin theiridentification, sometimes also their ACF values are equal and so things get complicated (it could also happen that the same waveform exhibits different ACFs according to the input data signaling rate, as in the case of MIL 188-110 ST). In cases of uncertainty or ambiguity, a carefulexamination maydecide the questions.
Below just an example about  the 'THALES TRC-1752' and 'ARCOTEL MAHRS 2400' signals: they not only have the same PSK-8 2400Bd single tone features but also the same ACF. 
(Althought THALES TRC-1752 is a "modem"and ARCOTEL MAHRS is a "standard", I  generically refer to both as "signals").

Looking at their representation in the waterfall, they have a quite similar shape characterized by the same bandwidth, a non-fixed length duration and a short preamble: a first difference is visible just in this part. Looking with a little more attention, the Arcotel preamble is composed of 8+8 simmetrical tones while Thales signal exhibits a different header (fig. 1).

fig. 1
The data transfer parts of the two signals share the same features: 8-ary phase-shift keying of a single 1800 Hz carrier and 2400 symbols/sec modulation rate (input data signaling rate is not detected here). It's interesting to note the enhanced BPSK footprints that, unless their phase shift, appear in both the constellations of the signals (fig. 2).

fig. 2
These footprints suggest the presence of BPSK segments in the structure of both the two signals. As from literature, they consist ofknown-data symbols, in contrast with the unknown (user) data, and are are scrambled to appear, on-air, as PSK-8 symbols.
The BPSK insertions, as well as the differences between the two preambles,are more evident reducing the FFT size in the waterfall (fig. 3).

fig. 3
Looking at the two waterfalls, both with the same settings, we can also estimate that the two signals have the same patternrepetition rate (pic.3). Running the ACF and CCF functions for a better accuracy of the repetition rate, we get the same 106.665 ms result for both the signals: this value makes 468 bits, or 256 PSK-8 symbols periods since themanipulation speed is 2400Bd.

At this point, the real difference betweenthese two signals, unless the preamble, canonly befoundby examiningtheir frame structures.

The frame structure for the Arcotel signal is shown in figure 4. The preamble is followed by 256 symbols blocks, each block consisting of 176 unknown data symbols and a mini-probe consisting of 80 symbols of known data. This isthe MIL 188-110 ST style waveform.

fig. 4 - frame structure for Arcotel MAHRS serial
The frame structure for the Thales signal is shown in figure 5. As well as in the frame of Arcotel signal, the frame cosists of 256 symbols blocks, each block consisting of 80 symbols preamble followed by 176 symbols data block, each data block consisting of 4 x 32 unknown data symbols and 3 x 16 symbols mini-probes. This isthe STANAG-4285 style waveform.

fig. 5 - frame structure for THALES TRC-1752
It's worth noting that the two signals have the same length, 80 symbols, for the BPSK modulated  segment.

So, although both accomodate the same room, 256 symbols, they are formatted in different ways and thus belong to two different waveform families: MS188-110 (Arcotel MAHRS 2400 serial) and STANAG-4285 (THALES TRC-1752), each with its specific features and performances.

logs

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06378.0 ---: Australian MHFCS net, AUS 2250 ISB FSK 600Bd/340 (06Jun16) (AAI)
06733.0 IDR: Italian Navy, I 0710 USB/J3E calling ORALE, PILONE, BUSSOLA (14Jun16) (AAI)
06745.5 FS01: Algerian Mil, ALG 2130 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SZ01 (15Jun16) (AAI)
06931.0 ---: Unid (prob. Croatian Mil/Gov) 0555 USB modified STANAG-4285 waveform (four 100ms pre-tones at ~ 516,1216,1716,2616 Hz), short msgs (16Jun16) (AAI)
07455.0 NAA: Navy Isabela, PTR 0400 (cf) FSK 50Bd/850 (18Jun16) (AAI)
07508.7 D: MX Beacon "D" Sevastopol, UKR 2040 CW (19Jun16) (AAI)
07508.9 S: MX Beacon "S" Severomorsk, RUS 2040 CW (19Jun16) (AAI)
07526.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1950 USB AT-3004D 12-tone modem BPSK 120Bd (19Jun16) (AAI)
07527.0 03x:COTHEN Remote Directional Transmitter, Omaha, NE USA0420 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (18Jun16) (AAI)
07590.0 CNC: Algerian AF, ALG 2042 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling CM3 (19Jun16) (AAI)
07596.0 DB3: Special Troops Battalion region 3 Kut, IRQ 1836 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling COM (19Jun16) (AAI)
07617.0 331013: Turkish Civil Defense Hatay, TUR 1910 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (19Jun16) (AAI)
07617.0 364013: Turkish Civil Defense Usak, TUR 0355 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (18Jun16) (AAI)
07629.0 DB3: Special Troops Battalion region 3 Kut, IRQ 1827 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling JQ1 (19Jun16) (AAI)
07651.0 BB3: Israeli AF, ISR 1916 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (19Jun16) (AAI)
07655.0 AA1: Israeli AF, ISR 1850 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (19Jun16) (AAI)
07655.0 AAA: Israeli AF, ISR 2050 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (19Jun16) (AAI)
07731.0 TM6: Unid network 1839 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling TM5 (19Jun16) (AAI)
07739.0 3127: Sonatrach, ALG 0352 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (18Jun16) (AAI)
07739.0 3404: Sonatrach, ALG 2035 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (19Jun16) (AAI)
07739.0 4011: Sonatrach, ALG 1914 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (19Jun16) (AAI)
07748.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1919 USB AT-3004D 12-tone modem BPSK 120Bd (19Jun16) (AAI)
07771.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 2053 USB AT-3004D 12-tone modem BPSK 120Bd (19Jun16) (AAI)
07809.0 DB3: Special Troops Battalion region 3 Kut, IRQ 1854 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling JQ1 (19Jun16) (AAI)
07820.0 ---: Unid 1950 USB Arab voice comms, ~ 1220Hz beep (19Jun16) (AAI)
07824.5 BL7: Polish Mil, POL 0728 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BL6 (06Jun16) (AAI)
07824.5 MA1: Polish Mil, POL 0728 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BL6 (06Jun16) (AAI)
07850.0 CHU: NRC Ottawa, CAN 0406 USB 1000 hz second pips /BELL 300 bps data (18Jun16) (AAI)
07937.0 ---: Unid 1924 USB STANAG-4285 1200/L (19Jun16) (AAI)
07959.0 REA4: Russian AF, RUS 1858 (cf) FSK 100Bd/1000, idle (19Jun16) (AAI)
07990.0 RFI: Saudi AF, ARS 1941 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling JC1 (19Jun16) (AAI)
08494.9 D: MX Beacon "D" Sevastopol, UKR 2057 CW (16Jun16) (AAI)
08494.9 S: MX Beacon "S" Severomorsk, RUS 2057 CW (16Jun16) (AAI)
08580.0 ---: South Africa Navy, RSA 2104 USB Saab Grintek MHF-50 MFSK Modem (13Jun16) (AAI)
08800.0 ---: Unid 0616 USB STANAG-4285 600L KG-84 encrypted transmission (16Jun16) (AAI)
08815.0 SCPTOC: US-Army Camp Bondsteel, HRV 2109 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (16Jun16) (AAI)
10165.0 ---: Unid 0702 USB RFSM serial modem with Data Masking, QRX 10170.0 (10Jun16) (AAI)
10370.0 SPT424: Polish Mil, POL 1132 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with SNB813 (05Jun16) (AAI)
11130.0 C4: Moroccan Military, MRC 2039 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (06Jun16) (AAI)
11577.2 ---: Russian Intel 2043 (cf + 1800Hz) MFSK-16 175Hz 65.80Bd (06Jun16) (AAI)
12120.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0654 USB CIS-3000 PSK-8 3000Bd serial flwd by MFSK-68 (34+34) (06Jun16) (AAI)
14363.0 CENTR2: MFA Bucharest, ROU 0629 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling ZMF (14Jun16) (AAI)
14449.5 ---: Russian Air Force, RUS 0635 (cf) FSK 100Bd/2000 (14Jun16) (AAI)
14628.0 ---: MFA Cairo EGY 2028 USB (cf +1700) SiTOR ARQ 100Bd/170 calling RCVB Washington Embassy (16Jun16) (AAI)
14951.2 ---: Russian Intel 1307 (cf + 1800Hz) MFSK-16 175Hz 16.44Bd (06Jun16) (AAI)
15025.0 ---: Unid 1230 USB STANAG-4197 modem, using second tone library only (OFDM 16-tone DQPSK 75Bd) (12Jun16) (AAI)
15252.2 ---: Unid (prob. ustrian Army?) 0817 USB MIL 188-141 App.B, OFDM 39-tone QPSK (07Jun16) (AAI)
15940.05 ---: Unid (prob. Russian gov/mil) 0815 (cf) FSK 40(39.76)Bd/500 (Moroz system?) (16Jun16) (AAI)
16023.0 ---: MFA Cairo, EGY 0739 USB (cf +1700Hz) SiTOR ARQ 100Bd/170 calling OOVC New Delhi Embassy, then into SiTOR-FEC sending for 7 times "FMFM FMFMFMFMFMFMFMFMFMFM  MDRS JG KDCFUSG 22281" (14Jun16) (AAI)
16072.2 ---: Russian Intel 1250 (cf + 1800Hz) MFSK-16 175Hz 16.44Bd (06Jun16) (AAI)
16104.0 ---: Russian Navy, RUS 1255 CIS Akula ("Shark"), FSK 500Bd/1000 (05Jun16) (AAI)
16116.5 OEY61: Austrian Mil, AUT 0629 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with OEY20 then into MIL 188-110 App.B (17Jun16) (AAI)
16122.0 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 0756 (cf) Serdolik sync marker (08Jun16) (AAI)
16125.0 STAT16: Tunisian MOI, TUN 0725 USB (cf +1700) weak PacTOR-II 100Bd/200, HF e-mail "DEFAULT@#HFARQ#STAT16" (15Jun16) (AAI)
16161.0 20001: Iranian Mil, IRN 0909 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (07Jun16) (AAI)
16175.0 ---: Russian Mil/Gov, RUS 0550 USB CIS VFT 3x100 100Bd/1440 (17Jun16) (AAI)
16223.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0830 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (07Jun16) (AAI)
16234.2 ---: Russian Intel 0739 (cf + 1800Hz) MFSK-16 175Hz 16.44Bd (07Jun16) (AAI)
16240.0 11021: MOROCCAN DGPC, MRC 0919 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (07Jun16) (AAI)
16256.5 ---: Unid (prob French Mil?) 0645 USB Thales Systeme-3000 ALE (06Jun16) (AAI)
16262.5 ---: Unid (prob French Mil?) 0739 USB THALES Skymaster ALE + THALES TRC 177x/1752 serial modem (08Jun16) (AAI)
16285.0 STAT11: Tun-MOI, TUN 0837 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with TUD then into PacTOR-II (07Jun16) (AAI)
16285.0 STAT151: Tun-MOI, TUN 0826 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling STAT13 (07Jun16) (AAI)
16300.0 CM1: Algerian AF, ALG 0839 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BFK (07Jun16) (AAI)
16311.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0638 USB CIS-112 OFDM BPSK 22.22Bd burst mode then into stream mode(06Jun16) (AAI)
16352.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0816 FSK 50Bd/500 msgs, ACF 16 bit (15Jun16) (AAI)
16484.5 ---: Unid (prob French Mil?) 0905 USB THALES Skymaster ALE Skyhopper mode (07Jun16) (AAI)
16555.0 ---: North Korean Diplo, DPRK 0906 LSB (cf +1500) DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (07Jun16) (AAI)
16634.5 ---: Unid (prob. German Mil) 1326 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 serial 2400Bd PSK-8, ACF 106.66ms (10Jun16) (AAI)
16648.1 GUC: Unid net 0849 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling PHR (07Jun16) (AAI)
17469.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0545 USB MFSK-68 (34+34) (17Jun16) (AAI)
17976.0 HAWSPR: USAF Ascencion Is. SIPR-net, ASC 0811 USB USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (15Jun16) (AAI)
18270.0 ---: Unid (prob. Czech Diplo) 0745 USB (cf +1500) PacTOR-III (10Jun16) (AAI)

CIS-112 preambles

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In this sample, recordered today on 16311.0 KHz/USB starting from 0654 UTC, the bursts are probably used as a sort of selcall or wake-up signaling before sending the data. The parameters of the two signals are the standard ones for the CIS-112 modem: BPSK modulation, as part of the basic π/4 DQPSK, symbols rate of  22.22 symbols/sec and 25.6 Hz as carriers step (fig. 1)

fig. 1
They use two different synchronization preamble structures.

The preamble of the burst mode consists of three parts (fig. 2):

fig. 2
1) all symbols are transmitted for one symbol period element;
2) the seven tones 1, 7, 33, 49, 65, 81, 97 (step 16, dF = 410.25 Hz) are transmitted for a duration of 19 symbol element periods;
3) only the 56 odd tones (dF = 51,28 Hz) are transmitted for a duration of 11 symbol element periods.
The data transfer part of the burst mode follows the preamble and  consists of 45 symbol element periods, therefore no special cahrs are transmitted as it happens in the stream mode each 72 and 144 symbols (as discussedhere).
It's worth noting that in the burst mode the continuous pilot tone is transmitted at higher level during the seven-tones phase: +6dB than the odd-tones phase and  +12dB that the data phase (fig. 3).

fig. 3
The preamble of the stream mode consists of two parts (fig. 4):

fig. 4
1) initial part resembling a BPSK modulation 187Bd;
2) only the 56 odd tones (dF = 51,28 Hz) are transmitted for a duration of 36 symbol element periods.
During the odd-tones phase the pilot tone is transmitted at +6dB level higher than the data phase as it happens in the burst mode.

In both the two modes the 56 odd tones are transmitted with different but constant phases (fig. 5)

fig. 5

MIL 188-110B App. C (STANAG-4539 Annex B)

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in this recording a MIL 188-141 2G-ALE link setup between ALE calls 5CIND2 and 5CIND1, and two MIL 188-110B App.C 4800bps short sessions for data transfer. The Appendix C of MIL 188-110B describes the HF data modem waveforms for data rates above 2400 bps (3200, 4800, 6400, 8000, 9600, and optional uncoded 12800 bps) and  is  defined as High Data Rate Traffic Waveforms in STANAG-4539 Annex B (the counterpart NATO compatible standard).
This transmission was spotted on 10074.0 KHz/USB @ 0710 UTC, on June 22.

There are two clues that confirm this waveform:
1) the ACF value is 119.58ms and corresponds to a frame structure consisting of 287 symbols data block consisting of 256 data symbols followed by a mini-probe of 31 symbols of known data  (188-110C Appendix D has 120ms ACF and 256 +32 = 288 symbols per data block)

fig. 1 - ACF and frame structure
2) the preamble exhibits a clear 184 symbols blocks structure 

fig. 2 - preamble
Both the two structures are also visible looking at the bistream obtained after the PSK-8 symbols demodulation: the preamble consists of 552 bits and each data frame consists of 861 bits  (fig. 3)

fig. 3
Unfortunatelly it's a poor quality signal and the constellation is not so clear, although the 8-ary modulation is quite evident in figure 4. Since the 3200bps QPSK constellation is scrambled to appear on-air as a PSK-8 constellation, we can't be positive about the data rate. Compatible decoders say 4800bps Short interleaver.
 
filg. 4 -  PSK-8 'over-the-air' constellation
According to the standard, preamble re-insertions occur each 72 data frames, thus the reinsertion period Tr is 8,61 secs (20664 symbols): since the duration of each session is <Tr (in this recording we count 36-37 data frames) we then do not see such reinsertions (they are not transmitted).

Using the PSK-8 symbol mapping, each mini-probe is based on the repeated Frank-Heimiller sequence. The sequence that is used, specified in terms of the 8PSK symbol numbers, is given by:
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 4, 6, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 6, 4, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 4, 6, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 6, 4
This mini-probe are designated ‘+’. The phase inverted version of this is:
4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 2, 0, 6, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 2, 0
and mini-probes using this sequence are designated ‘-’ (as the phase of each symbol has been rotated 180 degrees from the ‘+’). The 72 mini-probes before the preamble reinsertion are grouped into four sets of 18 consecutive mini-probes (1 to 18, 19 to 36, 37 to 54, and 55 to 72). Pictorially, this length 18 sequence is:
- - - - - - - + S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 +
where the Si sign values are defined in Tables C-IX, C-X, and C-XI of MIL 188-110B. No scrambling is applied to the mini-probes symbols.
Since the low quality of the recording and the characteristics of the SA universal PSK demodulator, we can just apreciate a "nuance" of the mini-probe pattern (fig. 5). Maybe further and better recordings will help.

fig. 5 - 188-110B App.C mini-probes

Russian Air Force "Chayka", FSK 150Bd/500

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This transmission was heard this morning on 14781.1 Khz (cf) at 0720 UTC sending encrypted bursts of ~21 secs duration. "Chayka" is the nick name for this commands/signaling FSK messaging system used  for  (military) aircrafts-ground communications.
The shift is costant 500 Hz while the manipulation speed may be 75, 150, 300 and 1200 Baud: in this sample the measured speed is 150 Baud (fig. 1).

fig. 1 - manipulation speed and shift
Each "message" consists of a preamble phase and the data phase; during the preamble phase the lower tone frequency is transmitted followed by the alternation of the two tone frequencies. The data phase may consist of separated segments and/or insertions of the 2-tones alternation, as clearly visible in figure 2 where the signal has been resampled to 4 KHz.

fig. 2
At least according to this sample, the messages can be continuously transmitted as 2 in-a-row or 3 in-a-row without manipulation breaks (figure 3) and this affects the lengths of the preambles.

fig. 3

Siemens CHX200 F1-modem (CHP-200): FSK 249 & 250 Bd /170 Hz waveform

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The CHX200 F1-modem (also known as CHP200 or CHP-200, i.e. the name of the embedded comunications processor) has been built in Germany by Siemensand under license in Indonesia (for domestic use).  It is part of their CHX200 family of HF ECCOM frequency hopping equipment and it has been in production since 1981. Ops 1.3-30 MHz (all mode transceiver), 10 KHz-30 MHz (receive), in 100 Hz steps. Dependent on the deployment, its RF power levels range from 100 to 1000 Watts (CHX250 1000 watt station, CHX240 400 watt station, CHX210 100 watt station). Known accessories and major items include PA-400 power amplifier, ATU-400 antenna tuning unit, PA/ATU-100 power amplifier/antenna tuner, CHP-200 receiver/exciter with communications processor.

Thistransission consists of the selcall part followed by the non-hopping ARQ part and was heard on 10154.0 KHz, with a +1600Hz shift on USB, at 0815 UTC. The signals belong to the FSK family, the ARQ part is characterized by a costant 250 Bd manipulation speed and a shift of 170 Hz (figs. 1a, 1b).

fig. 1a - constant 250 Baud speed
fig. 1b - ISS bursts and IRS ACKs

The most interesting feature of this FSK signal consists in the different manipulation speeds used in the two 'segments' (here indicated as A and B) of the selcall procedure. Although the CHP200 logs (at least the ones that I found) report the 250 symbols/sec speed, a more accurate analysis of the signals shows two different speeds and this could suggest the use of the 2-way ARQ mechanism.
According to the speed measurements (and to the ARQ mechanism) it seems that the sender transmits data at 250 Baud while the acknowledgements are sent back by the receive peer at 249 Baud (fig. 2).

fig. 2
One could say that it's a tollerance question since the two speeds differ in only one sybol, but the difference between the segments A and Bis real and is clearly shown in figure 3 (obtained after the demodulation of the signal)
fig. 3
Other than the speeds, the two segments adopt different frame structures for their data transfer: 46 bits length (corresponding to a duration of 184ms) for the segment A and 36 bits length (144.5s) for the segment B, as shown in figs 4 and 5. Since these characteristics, I think that discussing about two distinct waveforms - rather than two segments of the same waveform - would be more appropriate.

fig. 4 - the 46 bits frame structure of the waveform A
fig. 5 - the 36 bit frame structure of the waveform B

The patterns visible in the two bistreams (fig 6) resemble data + ACKs and are another clue in favor of the ARQ.

fig. 6
Unfortunately I could not find official Siemens documentation about this modem and the selcall procedure: it would be interesting if someone could provide such info.
I want to thanks my friend Karapuz for pointing e in the right direction.
 

HF CRY-2001 (Sailor-2001) analog voice scrambler

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HF CRY-2001 (Sailor-2001) uses basic rolling code inversion, the transmitted audio bandwidth is split, inverted and spaced separately at an audio frequency point which changes with each over. The short sync burst (100 Baud 170 Hz shift FSK-2) at the beginning and end of each transmission is what lets the receiving unit know at which audio frequency the split has occurred and its spacing so it can be reassembled. This transmission was heard on 6446.0 KHz on USB at 2058 UTC.


One would think that the split/spacing value is easily obtained by demodulating the FSK sync, but it's not so easy. Indeed, each CRY-2001 unit has a 6 digit key assigned to it, in normal operation a user will exchange keys with another approved operator and this key will be used to encrypt the FSK sync burst so without it anyone listening (including other CRY-2001 units), can't get the split/spacing data to reassemble it.


This system is frequently used for comunications between small fishing boats, images and docs are available on the web.




logs

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02815.0 ---: Unid 2050 (CF) STANAG-4481 FSK 75Bd/850 (20Jun16) (AAI)
05824.0 HBM46: Swiss Military SUI 2154 VFT 2x 100Bd/170 (channels cf at -500, +500Hz) (30Jun16) (AAI)
06446.0 ---: Unid (prob. fishing boats) 2058 USB Sailor-2001 scrambler phone-comms (30Jun16) (AAI)
06777.2 ---: Unid (prob. German AF) 2134 USB STANAG 4285/600L short KG84-C message (22Jun16) (AAI)
06826.0 ---: Unid (prob. Lybian Army) 2206 USB Arab voice comms, roger beep (22Jun16) (AAI)
07474.5 ---: Unid 0634 USB Thales Systeme-3000 ALE (28Jun16) (AAI)
07498.0 ---: Unid 0621 USB  MIL 188-141 2G-ALE Link Protected (28Jun16) (AAI)
07530.0 VC21: Algerian Mil, ALG 0617 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling PY20 (28Jun16) (AAI)
07596.0 EK9: Greek Mil, GRC 0611 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GEF flwd by voice comm (28Jun16) (AAI)
07608.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0605 USB AT-3004D modem, MPSK-12 120Bd BPSK (28Jun16) (AAI)
07651.0 AA3: Israeli Air Force, ISR 0628 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (28Jun16) (AAI)
07651.0 BB1: Israeli Air Force, ISR 0626 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (28Jun16) (AAI)
07683.0 ---: Unid (here was Swiss Diplo) 0538 USB  MIL 188-141 2G-ALE Link Protected (28Jun16) (AAI)
07803.0 ---: Unid (prob. French Mil) 0520 (cf) ARQ-E 184.6Bd/850, long time idling, ACF 56 bits (28Jun16) (AAI)
07803.0 ---: Unid (prob. French Mil) 0634 USB Thales Systeme-3000 ALE (28Jun16) (AAI)
07809.0 DB3: Iraqi Border Police, IRQ 2032 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GM3 (30Jun16) (AAI)
08005.0 ---: Unid (prob Italian Navy) 0544 USB STANAG-4285 1200/L (28Jun16) (AAI)
08010.0 ---: Ukraine Mil, UKR 0550 USB MFSK-4 (double FSK) 96Bd 500Hz,(tones at -750, -250, +250, +750) (28Jun16) (AAI)
08016.0 Z01: National Protection and Rescue Directorate, HRV 2100 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (22Jun16) (AAI)
08166.0 ---: Unid 0723 (cf) FSK 200Bd/500 ACF 360 bits (01Jul16) (AAI)
08635.0 ---: Unid 0440 USB STANAG-4197 (29Jun16) (AAI)
09080.0 ---: Egyptian Navy, EGY 0602 USB voice comms (ashara, wahid) + STANAG-4197 (21Jun16) (AAI)
09177.0 ---: Unid (Swiss Diplo qrg) 0733 USB  MIL 188-141 2G-ALE Link Protected (28Jun16) (AAI)
09239.8 ---: Russian AF, RUS 0729 (cf) FSK 100Bd/1000 (28Jun16) (AAI)
09301.0 ---: Unid 0631 USB THALES Système 3000 robust MFSK-8 (23Jun16) (AAI)
10074.0 5CIN1D: 0707 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with 5CIN2D flwd by MIL 188-110B App.C 4800bps (22Jun16) (AAI)
10154.0 ---: Unid 0815 USB (cf +1600Hz) Siemens CHP-200 HF modem, FSK 250Bd/170, selcall flwd by ARQ mode (27Jun16) (AAI)
10168.0 ---: Unid (prob. German Mil) 0755 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 HF modem, ALE bursts (25Jun16) (AAI)
10175.0 334123: Civil Defence Istanbul, TUR 0702 MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling 310013 (25Jun16) (AAI)
10186.1 FUG: French Navy, F 0720 USB STANAG-4285 1200/L (25Jun16) (AAI)
10195.2 PBB: Dutch Navy Den Helder, HOL 0720 USB STANAG-4285 600/L (25Jun16) (AAI)
10264.1 FUE: French Navy, F  0722 USB STANAG-4285 1200/L (25Jun16) (AAI)
10334.5 XKJ: DHFCS ,UK 1419 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE, two-way handshake with XSS (26Jun16) (AAI)
10351.0 XRW: UK DHFCS, G 0749 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling XXS (29Jun16) (AAI)
10512.0 ---: Unid 0735 (cf) FSK 100Bd/250 (25Jun16) (AAI)
10516.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0715 USB AT-3004D modem, MPSK-12 120Bd BPSK (25Jun16) (AAI)
10535.0 RKT9: Russian Navy Smolensk, RUS 0834 (cf) FSK 50Bd/200 (25Jun16) (AAI)
10568.2 IDN: NCSA Naples, I 0759 USB STANAG-4285 600/L (25Jun16) (AAI)
10650.0 VX6: Venezuelan Navy, VEN 0810 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX1 (25Jun16) (AAI)
10662.0 ---: Unid 0740 (cf) FSK 100Bd/250 (25Jun16) (AAI)
10712.0 RKA73: Russian Navy Pskov, RUS 0845 (cf) FSK 50Bd/200 Msg Sync 0x1eb41eb2952 (25Jun16) (AAI)
10784.0 ---: Unid NATO 0706 ISB Link-11 CLEW (25Jun16) (AAI)
11466.05 ---: Unid 1325 NATO FSK 75Bd/850 faulty modem (partial lack of the upper frequency) (29Jun16) (AAI)
12120.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS USB 0720 CIS-128 OFDM 21Bd (20Jun16) (AAI)
12146.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS USB 0805 CIS-128 OFDM 21Bd (20Jun16) (AAI)
13200.0 Reach-312: 0554 USB J3E radio check with Sigonella (01Jul16) (AAI)
13373.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1155 CIS-112 OFDM 22.22Bd BPSK (22Jun16) (AAI)
13404.0 ---: Russian il, RUS 0445 (cf) CIS FSK 75Bd/250 (29Jun16) (AAI)
13482.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0550 USB MFSK-68 (34+34) (01Jul16) (AAI)
14350.0 ---: University Of Las Palmas Canary Islands, CNR 0635 HFDVL OFDM 73-tone modem tests (30Jun16) (AAI)
14485.5 XKJ: UK DHFCS, G 0635 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with XSS (30Jun16) (AAI)
14489.5 ---: Russian AF, RUS 0655 (cf) FSK 100Bd/2000 (27Jun16) (AAI)
14781.1 ---: Russian AF, RUS 0720 (cf) "Chayka" FSK 150Bd/500, 21.05 secs messages (27Jun16) (AAI)
14786.0 ---: Unid (prob. Bulgarian Diplo) 1130 USB USB RFSM-8000 modem with data-masking (30Jun16) (AAI)
16008.0 ---: North Korean Diplo, DRPK 0840 LSB (cf -1500Hz) ARQ 600Bd/600 (26Jun16) (AAI)
16106.3 ---: Unid 1228 USB STANAG-4285 1200bps/L, carrying 1536-bits protocol, formerly heard 100Hz below (21Jun16)
16125.0 ---: Tunisian MOI, TUN 0858 USB (cf +1500Hz) PacTOR-II (26Jun16) (AAI)
16169.0 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 1156 USB Serdolik selcall flwd by Serdolik MFSK-34 40Bd 40Hz (Crowd-36) (21Jun16) (AAI)
16240.0 1114: Unid (prob. Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC) 1427 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (28Jun16) (AAI)
16240.0 1313: Unid (prob. Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC) 1427 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (28Jun16) (AAI)
16256.5 ---: Unid 0652 USB Thales Systeme-3000 ALE handshake flwd by TRC-1752 serial PSK-8 2400Bd modem (30Jun16) (AAI)
16300.0 CM1: Algerian AF, ALG 0933 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling PLB (26Jun16) (AAI)
16300.0 CM1: Algerian AF, ALG 0941 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling EV1 (26Jun16) (AAI)
16300.0 EV1: Algerian AF, ALG 0938 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling CM1 (26Jun16) (AAI)
16311.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0655 USB CIS-112 OFDM 22.22Bd BPSK (24Jun16) (AAI)
16327.0 ---: Unid 0710 USB MIL 188-110 Serial 2400Bd PSK-8 (30Jun16) (AAI)
16332.4 "M": Cluster beacon M, Magadan 0645 CW "M" (21Jun16) (AAI)
16468.1 GUC: Unid (US Mil?) 1148 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SHL (21Jun16) (AAI)
16663.1 ---: Norwegian Navy Bergen, NOR 1000 USB STANAG-4285 600/L (26Jun16) (AAI)
16683.0 OSY: Sailmail Brugge, BEL 1514 USB (cf +1500Hz) PacTOR-III "OSY QTC: 1 9566 5844" (28Jun16) (AAI)
16740.0 (no call): Venezuelan Navy, VEN 0943 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX2 (26Jun16) (AAI)
16740.0 (no call): Venezuelan Navy, VEN 1036 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX1 (26Jun16) (AAI)
16740.0 VX6: Venezuelan Navy, VEN 1212 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX1 (26Jun16) (AAI)
16740.0 VX6: Venezuelan Navy, VEN 1413 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX1 (28Jun16) (AAI)
17381.0 ---: Iranian Net 1205 USB (cf + 1000Hz) Iranian QPSK 468.75Bd (30Jun16) (AAI)
17499.8 ---: Unid 0655 (cf) BPSK 125Bd (01Jul16) (AAI)

unid MFSK-4 160Bd 320Hz waveform

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Quite strong signal heard for a long time on 9099.6 KHz (cf) on 02 July and recordered via the well known remote SDR receiver running at the Dutch University of Twente  (aka TwenteSDR): thus the strength of the signal must be intended as related to the Twente location.  
I came across this signal at 1252 UTC while I was watching two close (apparently) STANAG-4285 transmissions: zooming the FFT (fig. 1) I saw a weak MFSK-4 pattern so I tried to tune it via TwenteSDR in hopes of having a better signal... and I was right.

fig. 1 - the MFSK-4 signal as received at my QTH
Once analyzed, the signal spreads ~1300 Hz bandwidth and exhibits a 160 symbol/sec speed and 320 Hz as space bewteen tones (fig. 2): usually MFSK signals have the spacing equal to the speed of manipulation or the double, but not always.

fig.2 - MFSK parameters
A similar MFSK-4 signal, but running at 50Bd 100Hz space, was reported here.
Name and user of the waveform is unknown to me, I didsome research and asked info to usually well-informed sources but unsuccessfully. Since the sensible differences bewteen the two receptions (see the screenshot at the top of the post  and figure 1) and the locations of the two receivers, it is reasonable to assume that if compared to my position (center Italy, Tuscany, locatorJN52) the signal could come from the north, possibly north-east.

fig. 3
It's worth noting that the STANAG-4285 at 9098.6 KHz USB in the screenshot of fig.1, the French Navy S4285 circuit from Saissac, at that time was not received at TwenteSDR (or at least very very weak). 

I also tried a coarse demodulation of the signal using the SA FSK demodulator and directly mapping the output numbers 0,1,2,3 to the correspondents binary values 00,01,10,11 (fig. 4).
 
fig. 4
The bistream obtained in this way is shown in fig. 5: the analyzer finds a 102 bit length period, but although nuances of a frame structure are visible... it's juts a pictoric idea of the signal and it makes a poor sense.

fig. 5

"T-207" recognition in CIS VFT systems

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Some days ago I heard some CIS VFT systems and in particular one of them, a six  100Bd/120Hzchannels, caught my attention. I already logged it but sent its main parameters as speed, modulation and shift, to my friend Karapuz asking if he knew the real name of that signal or the name of the modem. He told me that in last January he had just the same receptions and pointing an interesting discussion in radioscanner.ru about the coding used in such signals: T-207.  Although radioscanner is entirely in Russian, reading the opinion of the expert analyzers from this forum was interesting and I could figure out how detect the T-207.In this post I describe the way I sought its "signature" in some CIS VFT signals as:

a) 3 x 100Bd/1440Hz VFT system
b) FSK 100Bd/2000Hz (but not in all FSK 100Bd/2000)
c) 6 x 100Bd/120Hz VFT system


replicating the experiences seen in radioscanner.ru and getting the expected results. 
By the way, these VFT systems are easy to receive (with good strength, at least here in JN52) on 13-16 MHz USB bands, mainly during the morning  and seldom during weekends.
 
Since the lack of official documentation it's difficult to say if the (former Soviet) T-207 is a communication protocol or rather a physical device: guys from radioscanner talk about "equipment" (at least thisis the google translation from Russian) and probably it can be regarded as a modemin the same way as T-600 and T-206.

T-207 is quite old and it is used by CIS Mil as well as by Ukrainian Mil or other Ukrainian Governative users such as Diplomatic and/or Intelligence services: allegedly as a Soviet communication legacy. T-207 use (or it's used in) FSK waveforms and offerin-line encryption; its detection has to be manually spotted by processing the demodulated bitstream and checking if it matches the criteria described in the citedpost.
We have first to choose a 14 bit period for the bistream and then focus on the first 12 positions and count the amount of"1" symbols:
- if the amount counts 2 or 6 or 10: the last two symbols (13th and 14th bits) must be 10
- if 3 or 7: 00
- if 4 or 8: 11
- if 5 or 9: 01
In case the sum is 0, 1, 11 and 12, it can be assumed that the last two symbols will be 11, 01, 00 and 11, respectively. These rules are shown in tab. 1.
Tab.1 - T-207 criteria
Since the above rules act presumably as a synchronization mechanism, the signal will be decoded and decrypted once removed the columns 13 and 14.

 a) 3 x 100Bd/1440Hz VFT
fig. 1 - 3 x 100Bd/1440Hz VFT
In this signal we have three channels modulated at 100Bd and a pilot tone at ~3300 Hz (characteristic feature of Russian systems). Every channel has a 1440 Hz shift and 100 Baud speed, channels are separated by 480Hz steps and interleaved as in figure1.

In my test I usedthe lower channel (fig. 2).
 
fig. 2

The obtained bitstream must be processed using the right/left shift (one bit at time) and sometimes the negative polarity:  criteria of Tab. 1 must be checked in all the rows at each shift-step, in case of fails we go on shifting.Unless possible interferences and demodulator errors, I confirmd the T-207 signature (fig. 3).
 
fig. 3

b)FSK 100Bd/2000Hz 
fig. 4
Not all the the FSK 100Bd/2000Hz waveforms exhibit the T-207 signature: since the VFT systems are used by the main "home" station, we have to find the correspondent outstations that just work using the FSK 100Bd/2000Hz in duplex mode as shown in figure 5. One could say that this waveform is in some way complementary to a VFT system.
The IQ recording of the FFT visible in  fig. 5 was kindly given by Karapuz.

fig. 5
Once demodulated, I had to repeate the same procedure seen above. Results are shown in figure 7.

fig. 6
 
fig. 7

c) 6 x 100Bd/120Hz VFT

Fig. 8
the 6 x 100Bd/120 system (a variant of the 3 x 100Bd/1140 system) allows six independent channels, each of them exhibits 440 Hz shift and 120 Baud speed: in this sample the one-of-six mode is used. T-207 signature was found after processing the demodulated bitstream in the usual way as in the previous examples (figs 9,10).

fig. 9
fig. 10
According to these results, it seems that T-207 is a prerogative of (at least) these VFT systems.

"Serdolik" 40Bd mixed mode: OFDM 45 and 60 tones, MFSK-31, and a pich of FSK

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One of the numerous variant of the nicknamed "Serdolik" system heard on 11469.0 KHz on USB. Such composite signals are not frequent in the air but sometimes, and fora short period ofdays, they spring up like magic. Who knows?  maybe the Russian Academy of Communication students take graduate work :).
 
Most of the transfer is performed with OFDM with short MFSK/FSK inserts at irregular cadences: it's interesting to note that all these modulations are characterized by the same 40 symbols/sec data rate. 

The used OFDM are the 60 (60 +1 pilot) and 45 (45 +1 pilot) tones waveforms, both with channel separation of 50Hz and - as said - 40 Baud speed (figs 1,2). The MFSK/FSK inserts occur in both the two modes. The 60+1 tones waveform was already meet here.

fig. 1 - OFDM 60-tones (+ 1 Pilot)
fig. 2 - OFDM 45-tones (+ 1 Pilot)
The switch bewteen the two modes just occured after an MFSK/FSK insert (fig-3)

fig. 3 - switch between the two OFDM waveforms
The parameters of the MFSK/FSK inserts are easy to measure: MFSK-31 40BD speed and 40Hz separation, FSK 40Bd 200Hz and 600 Hz shifts. I only show the MFSK detection in figure 4.

fig. 4 - MFSK parameters
Trasmission was closed by a series of MFSK/FSK bursts as shown in fig. 5

fig. 5
Apart from the affinity to the Serdolik "family" (clues are the MFSK-31 and the OFDM waveforms), it's improbable to say something more precise since the lack of official documentation.

summer logs

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05410.0 3127: Sonatrach, ALG 2152 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (11Jul16) (AAI)
06592.0 ---: Moscow Radio, RUS 2136 J3E/USB working 7882 (phone patch request) (11Jul16) (AAI)
06759.0 ---: UK DHFCS, G 0643 USB STANAG-4481 FSK 75Bd/850, KG-84C encryption (11Jul16) (AAI)
06779.0 ---: Unid 0632 USB RFSM-8000 modem with data-masking (11Jul16) (AAI)
06831.0 R51: NPRD Net, HRV 0715 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (09Jul16) (AAI)
06831.0 Z02: NPRD Net, HRV 0754 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (09Jul16) (AAI)
06864.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0654 USB CIS-3000 PSK-8 3000Bd serial (10Jul16) (AAI)
06931.0 ---: Unid (prob. Croatian Mil) 0720 STANAG-4285 modified waveform (11Jul16) (AAI)
06998.0 EK9: Greek Mil, GRC 0621 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GEF (11Jul16) (AAI)
07805.0 ---: Unid (prob French Mil) 0740 (cf) ARQ-E 184.6Bd/850, idle no traffic (11Jul16) (AAI)
08010.0 ---: Ukraine Mil, UKR 0610 USB MFSK-4 (double FSK) 96Bd 500Hz,(tones at -750, -250, +250, +750) (04Jul16) (AAI)
08190.0 RHP: Saudi Mil, ARS 1753 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling AAP (10Jul16) (AAI)
09044.0 ---: Unid 0550 (cf) FSK 100Bd/500, ACF 192 bit (11Jul16) (AAI)
09099.6 ---: Unid 1252 (cf) MFSK-4 120Bd 320Hz (02Jul16) (AAI)
10344.5 XKJ: UK DHFCS, G 0525 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with XSS (13Jul16) (AAI)
10642.0 AA1: Israeli Air Force, ISR 0530 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Jul16) (AAI)
10650.0 VX6: Venezuelan Navy, VEN 0517 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX1 (13Jul16) (AAI)
10723.0 SPT424: Polish Mil, POL 1144 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with SNB813 flwd by voice comms (11Jul16) (AAI)
11213.0 MKL: RAF Northwood, G 1143 USB STANAG-4481 FSK 75Bd/850, KG-84C encryption (11Jul16) (AAI)
11469.0 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 1425 USB "Serdolik" 40Bd mixed mode, MFSK-31 + OFDM 45 and 60 tones (09Jul16) (AAI)
12143.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0658 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz modem (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (05Jul16) (AAI)
12153.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS (cf) MFSK-68 (34+34) + QPSK 2400Bd 10KHz wide inserts (06Jul16) (AAI)
13370.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1135 USB CIS-45 OFDM 45-tones HDR modem v1, 33Bd BPSK (05Jul16) (AAI)
13499.0 13262: Moroccan Police, MRC 1348 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (12Jul16) (AAI)
13500.0 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian Mil/Gov) 0540 USB T-207, 2 of 6x100Bd/120 VFT system (06Jul16) (AAI)
13500.0 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian net) 0545 USB T-207 3 of 6x100Bd/120Hz VFT system (13Jul16) (AAI)
13910.0 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian Mil/Gov) 0603 USB T-207, 3 of 6x100Bd/120 VFT system (06Jul16) (AAI)
13910.0 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian net) 0547 USB T-207 4 of 6x100Bd/120Hz VFT system (13Jul16) (AAI)
13982.0 ---: Unid (prob. Globe Wireless) 0755 USB (cf @ +1500Hz) PacTOR-III, sending "JOHST 0" cmd (Exiting Host mode) (06Jul16) (AAI)
14352.0 CENTR4: MFA Bucharest, ROM 0557 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshaking SQA flwd by MIL 188-110 Serial carrying STANAG-5066 (13Jul16) (AAI)
14357.0 ---: Russian Mil 1308 USB OFDM 60-tone HDR modem, p/8 DPSK-8 35.5Bd (06Jul16) (AAI)
14485.5 XKJ: UK DHFCS, G 1325 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with XSS flwd by MIL 188-110 Serial (06Jul16) (AAI)
14508.0 5601: unid Iranian net, IRN 0712 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Jul16) (AAI)
14550.0 C4: Moroccan Military, MRC 0736 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (03Jul16) (AAI)
14550.0 J62: Moroccan Military, MRC 0816 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (03Jul16) (AAI)
14550.0 O73: Moroccan Military, MRC 0814 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (03Jul16) (AAI)
14550.0 X24: Moroccan Military, MRC 0806 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (03Jul16) (AAI)
14609.5 OEY61: Austrian UNIFIL-Contingent in Naqoura, LBN (?) 0620 USB sending MIL 188-110 App.B traffic to OEY80 (12Jul16) (AAI)
14623.0 ---: Unid 0727 USB Thales Systeme-3000 ALE (13Jul16) (AAI)
14700.0 STA5: Tunisian MOI, TUN 1319 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshaking STA154 (13Jul16) (AAI)
14713.2 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1150 USB OFDM 128-tone (65+64) 21Bd QPSK (04Jul16) (AAI)
14790.0 VX6: Venezuelan Navy, VEN 0727 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling VX1 (13Jul16) (AAI)
14849.5 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian net) 0615 T-207 FSK 100Bd/2000, 3x100Bd/1440Hz VFT system outstation (the other 2 are on 14569.5 and 14489.5) (12Jul16) (AAI)
14862.1 ---: Unid network 0744 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE Link Protected mode (12Jul16) (AAI)
15660.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0745 USB OFDM 128-tone (65+64) broadband (6000Hz) 42Bd QPSK flwd by CIS-3000 serial 3000Bd PSK-8 (04Jul16) (AAI)
16046.0 ---: Russian Diplo/Intel, RUS 0740 USB Serdolik MFSK-34 40Bd 40Hz (aka Crowd-36) (13Jul16) (AAI)
16122.0 ---: Russian Diplo/Intel, RUS 0745 (cf) Serdolik sync timing (13Jul16) (AAI)
16161.0 20001: Iranian Mil, IRN 0814 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (09Jul16) (AAI)
16252.5 OEY61: Austrian Mil, AUT 0831 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling OEY20 (06Jul16) (AAI)
16283.7 KWX57: US unid DoS Station 0817 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding flwd by op voice requesting a radio check (06Jul16) (AAI)
16402.0 ABA: Maltese Navy, MLT 1340 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling AB1 (1Jul16) (AAI)
16468.2 GUC: Unid network 1723 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SHL (11Jul16) (AAI)
16468.2 PHR: Unid network 1749 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GUC (11Jul16) (AAI)
16468.2 SHL: Unid network 1447 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GUC (11Jul16) (AAI)
16809.0 WLO: USA Mobile Marine Radio Alabama, AL 2245 CW/ARQ "WLO" (08Jul16) (AAI)
16959.1 ---: Unid 2301 (cf) STANAG-4481, FSK 75Bd/850 KG-84C encryption (08Jul16) (AAI)
17095.1 WHL: USA St Augustine Radio,FL 2151 CW/ARQ "CQ DE WHL" (08Jul16) (AAI)
17125.0 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian Mil/Gov) 0614 USB T-207, 3x100Bd/1440 VFT system (05Jul16) (AAI)
17156.0 5601: unid Iranian net, IRN 1154 SB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (10Jul16) (AAI)
17223.7 ---: Unid 0800 USB (carrier not suppressed) STANAG-4285 1200/L, unid datalink protocol (12Jul16) (AAI)
17403.0 ABA: Maltese Navy, MLT 0830 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling AB1 (09Jul16) (AAI)
17974.0 PLASPR: USAF Lajes Field, AZR 2123 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (08Jul16) (AAI)

(Unid) PSK-8 4800/2400Bd & OFDM 15-tones QPSK Hybrid Modem

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This is an example of a "teamgroup" analysis: the signals were originally spotted by KarapuZ, then analyzed together by me, cryptomaster and IK1YDE: the discussion can be read here ("ansanto" is my nickname in radioscanner.ru forum)

The signal show up in FEC burst and ARQ modes with symbol rates of 4800 Baud (6000Hz bandwidth) and 2400 Baud (3000Hz bandwidth). 
The first weirdness we saw is just related to the baudrate lines of the signal in both the two speeds. As shown in figure 1, each burst consists of the preamble segment followed by the data segment: a strong 4800Bd line is visible only in the firts segments of the bursts, preambles, while just weak nuances are visible in the second segments.

fig. 1 - strong 4800Bd lines for preamble segments
In order to understand the used modulation we have isolated a single burst and then tried its harmonics: results are another weirdness. As shown in figure 2, the signal exhibits a clear PSK-8 modulation in preamble segment "A" (as expected, since its baudrate line) followed by short PSK-2 insert but no signs of modulation in the second segment "B" (altough the weak baudrate lines in fig.1).

fig. 2 - modulation harmonics in a single burst
Other than the 4800 Baud 8-ary constellation (shown in fig. 3) the segments A are characterized by a 53.33ms ACF that matches a 256 bits frame structure (fig. 4).

fig. 3 - PSK-8 single tone modulation at 4800 Baud in segments A
fig. 4 - 53.33ms ACF in segments A
For what concerns the segments B I suggested to isolate each of them from the ARQ signal and merge them together to form one unique file and then use the OFDM approach to study just that file. Cryptomaster spotted OFDM 15-tones structure and also isolated a single channel, detecting the presence of QPSK modulation: figures 5 and 6 show my tests that confirm his OFDM-15 238Bd QPSK observations.

fig. 5 - OFDM 15-tones in segments B
fig. 6 - inspecting a single OFDM channel
What remains still unclear, other than the source/user of the transmissions, is the reason of the baudrate line in the segments B since OFDM normally does not cause such pattern in the modulation harmonics.
To be thorough, figs 7,8 show the same behaviors in the 2400Bd waveform.

fig. 7 - strong 2400Bd lines in segments A
fig.8 - PSK-8 modulation only in 2400Bd waveform segments A
 

unusual FSK 50Bd 40Hz

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quite unusual FSK signal heard by my friend KarapuZ on 14581.0 Khz on USB: such shift (40 Hz) is rare on these high frequencies. ACF not measurable (=0). Thanks to KarapuZ for sending me the record.



PacTOR-II, modulation changes

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In this examples (recordered on 16285.0 KHz/USB) the PacTOR-II modem exhibits the ability to adapt its modulation method (and data rate) dynamically based on channel conditions or on current needs (ie broadcast/PtP). Since PacTOR is not an auto-baud waveform, this routine (knows as 'PacTOR-II AUTO') is usually implemented in the controller/modem firmware.
Looking at this case, Tunisian Minister of Interior network, the used mode seems to be reported in the addresses of the email (HFARQ STAT11, HFARQ STAT151) sent after the 188-141 2G-ALE handshake (fig. 1): most likely, their adopted messaging system is implemented on ARQ just per deafult.

fig. 1 - 188-141 2G-ALE followed by PacTOR-II email
These records (figs 2,3) refer to two separate email transmissions: in the former (1137 local time) the modem use the DPSK-8 FEC mode while in the latter (1213) the modem switched to the more reassuring DBPSK ARQ. Modulation rates remain constant (100 symbol/sec).

fig. 2 - PacTOR-II FEC PSK-8 100Bd
fig. 3 - PacTOR-II ARQ PSK-2 100Bd
According to the two spectrograms, the channel conditions degrade since the strength of the received signaldecreases and this couldjustify thechange of modulation. However it is fair to say that the tx antenna may use different beamings.
 

STANAG-4538 complete session

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15945.0 ---: Unid 0918 UTC USB, STANAG-4538 Fast Link setup (FLSU) burst followed by Low rate Data Link (LDL) forward transmissions (BW3, fig. 1) and ACK bursts. The transfer session end is signaled by the LDL EOM burst, similar to a normal BW4 acknowledgement but sent by the source. Since the presence of the HARRIS Citadel encryption pattern in  the data bursts (fig. 2), most likely the used equipment is the HARRIS Falcon II family RF-5800H.
fig.1 - LDL BW3 autocorrelation
fig. 2 - BW3 frame (32 symbols) and Citadel encryption pattern
The presence of the Fast Link Setup (FLSU) burst at the beginning of the transmission (fig. 3) say that this is not a MIL 188-141B/C waveform since FLSU is not defined in such standard but only Robust Link Setup (RLSU). RLSU is hence the only link setup mode providing interoperability between STANAG 4538 and 141B/C.
fig. 3 - FLSU burst
It's worth nothing that in 3G HF the typical 188-141 2-way traffic management handshake has been removed; instead, a control burst segment has been introduced to each forward transmission.

Unid QPSK 2400Bd 112.5ms ACF

HDL+ (a proposed enhanced protocol for STANAG-4538)

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At a first glance this transmission resembles the STANAG-4538 forward+ACK structure, but the lengths of the bursts and their frame formats do not match the ones specified for the HDL and LDL protocols. Encouraged by my colleague KarapuZ, I tried the HDL+ approach in the analysis of these signals.

HDL+ protocol is based on the combination of the high data rate waveforms from STANAG-4539 (or MIL 188-110B App.C) and the code combining techniques in the xDL data link protocols of STANAG-4538.

fig. 1 - BW7 waveforms
As in STANAG-4538, the HDL+ transmisssion is composed of data forward bursts and ACK messages bursts. The forward transmission (datagram) in HDL+  consists of a header, which is transmitted using the Burst Waveform 6 (BW6) for robustness, and a data section sent with the Burst Waveform 7 (BW7) for higher speed: the BW6, which is also used for the ACK messages, is much more robust than the BW7.

The structure of the HDL+ forward burst can be verified isolating a single burst and zooming the FFT as in figure 2,it's worth noting the presence of the 2 mini-probes initial sequence that follows the header and marks the beginning of the data section.

fig. 2 - BW7 header and data section
The constellation in figure 3, obtained from that same burst, reveals a PSK-8 modulation with constant symbol rate of 2400Bd: it's another clue in favor of HDL+ since it is based on STANAG-4538/188-110B waveforms.

fig. 3 - PSK-8 constellation for BW7 4800 bps
From the scarce documentation available in the web, the BW7 data section consists of an initial probe sequence of 64symbols followed by a data sequence of 256 data symbolsalternated with 32 symbols long mini-probes (fig. 4): so total frame symbols sums to 288, 256/32 unknown/known format (by the way, STANAG-4538 HDL provides PSK-832/16 unknown/known frame format for its forward transmissions).

fig. 4 - BW7 frame format
My results exactly match such frameformat (fig. 5): the ACF value is 120ms, that makes 288 symbols @ 2400 Baud. Note that the two mini-probes initial sequence indicated in fig. 4 was seen above in the zoomed FFT in fig. 2.

fig. 5 - ACF and frame formator HDL+ BW7
As further confirmation, the analysis of the demodulated bitstream produces the same results: the frame period is 864 bit long and the mini-probes length is 96 bit (fig. 6).

fig. 6 - analysis of the demodulated BW7 bitstream
Since the results (header structure, signal constellation, and frame format) the signal can be identified as HDL+ BW7,in this case the 4800bps PSK-8 waveform.

At a cursory glance  "HDL+ BW7" may be confused with "188-110C App.D 3KHz WID7" and converselysince they just use the same 288 symbols 256/32.In the absence of appropriate analysis tools, one  may discriminate between HDL+ and 188-110C by carefully analyzing, at physical layer, the preambles ("synchronization preamble" in 188-110C, "header" in HDL+) and the data sections.

- "The 188-110C synchronization preamble consists of two main sections, a transmitter level control (TLC) settling time section, and a synchronization section containing a repeated preamble super-frame." [D.5.2.1 MS188-110C App.D]

- HDL+ does not have TLC, its header is shorter than 188-110C App. preamble and is  transmitted  in  386.67  ms

fig. 7 - 188-110C synchronization preamble
fig. 8 - HDL+ header
- the HDL+ data section begins with 2 mini probes
- the 188-110C data section begins with 1 mini-probe


fig. 9 - data sections

Bearing in mind the above considerations about preambles and data sections, one can easily face the analysis of burst signals like this (fig. 10)


fig. 10
Once checked the headers and thelengthof the data sections, and found to be 288 symbols, I used the "harmonics" tool in order to get the modulations: I also used the zoom tool to better clarify the differences in each forward burst. A partial result at 8^ power is shown in figure 11: the PSK-8 headers (BW6) are well visible, while the data sections (BW7) use different modulations according to the table of figure 1.

fig. 11
Analyzing all the forward bursts, I could identify the presence of the QAM-16 and QAM-64 BW7 waveforms, other than the PSK-8 waveform. 

fig. 12 - 4800 bps PSK-8 BW7 waveform
fig. 13 - 6400 bps BW7 QAM-64 waveform
fig. 14 - 9600/12800 bps BW7 QAM-64 waveform
It is worth noting in figs. 15,16 that the typical 188-110 QAM-n constellations in 'circular rings'are modified with respect to the standard ones.

fig. 15
fig. 16
 
annotation
As far as I know, HDL+ is developed and patended by Harris and is integrated in their Falcon II RF-5800H systems. Harris has proposed NATO its new data link protocol, HDL+, for ratification in STANAG 4538. Do not know if other manufacturers have implemented their own HDL+ version. 
More detailed informations about HDL+ can be found in the document "Adaptive Coding and Modulation Techniques for HF Communication"  by NTNU - Norwegian University of Science and Technology, the pdf file can be downloaded fromhere


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04906.0 HBM46: Swiss Military, SUI 0645 VFT-TMS430 2 x 100Bd/180 (channels cf at -500, +500Hz) (02Aug16) (AAI)
05824.0 HBM46: Swiss Military, SUI 0650 VFT-TMS430 2 x 100Bd/180 (channels cf at -500, +500Hz) (02Aug16) (AAI)
06510.0 Z1V: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0617 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE 3-way handshake with S1L (22Jul16) (AAI)
06510.0 Z1V: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0620 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE 3-way handshake with P1O (22Jul16) (AAI)
06510.0 Z1V: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0623 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE 3-way handshake with K1U (22Jul16) (AAI)
06510.0 Z1V: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0625 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE 3-way handshake with N1R (22Jul16) (AAI)
06516.0 ---: Unid 0606 J3E/USB lady talking in english about tour in mediterranean sea, QSY 8134 (22Jul16) (AAI)
06733.0 ---: Unid 1345 USB THALES Système 3000 robust MFSK-8 (14Jul16) (AAI)
06745.5 ND01: Unid (prob. Tunisian/Algerian Mil) 0629 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KF01 (19Jul16) (AAI)
06765.0 BU4: Roumenian Police Bucuresti, ROU 0658 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling IAS (02Aug16) (AAI)
06779.0 ---: Unid 0700 USB RFSM-8000 modem with data-masking (02Aug16) (AAI)
06790.0 SP3OZ2: Sonatrach Pumping Station 3,OZ-2-Pipeline, ALG 0543 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (22Jul16) (AAI)
06801.0 ---: (no call) NPRD net, HRV 0708 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling K51 (21Jul16) (AAI)
06801.0 D20: Croatian NPRD Dubrovnik, HRV 0532 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (22Jul16) (AAI)
06801.0 K51: Croatian NPRD, HRV 0522 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (22Jul16) (AAI)
06801.0 Z01: Croatian NPRD, HRV 1317 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (14Jul16) (AAI)
06803.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0650 CW "VVVV VVVV VVVV K" (19Jul16) (AAI)
06806.0 PY30 Algerian Mil, ALG 0646 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling RK31 (22Jul16) (AAI)
06813.0 HBM46: Swiss Military SUI 0540 VFT 2x 100Bd/170 (channels cf at -500, +500Hz) (19Jul16) (AAI)
06906.0 5003: SONATRACH ALG 0543 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (29Jul16) (AAI)
06912.0 LIS: Unid network 0640 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling WTF (22Jul16) (AAI)
06916.5 ---: Unid 1309 ALIS 228.65Bd/200 calling address 70 (14Jul16) (AAI)
06972.0 ---: Unid 0636 USB STANAG-4197 single (test?) burst (19Jul16) (AAI)
07047.5 HB9AK: Winlink Mail gw, SUI 0707  Winmor-500 messages (21Jul16) (AAI)
07518.5 WA1: Polish Mil, POL 0715 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE 2-way handshake with KO1, flwd by weak 188-110A carryng STANAG-5066 DLP data (22Jul16) (AAI)
07553.0 K1U: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0716 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling Z1V (29Jul16) (AAI)
07594.5 IET32: Comando Arma Carabinieri Ancona, I 0650 J3E/LSB radio check with IET571,IET580,IET590, ... (18Jul16) (AAI)
07594.5 IET33: Arma Carabinieri Firenze, I 0645  J3E/LSB radio check with IET731,IET692,IET665,... (20Jul16) (AAI)
07594.5 IET56: Arma Carabinieri (unid station), I 0645 J3E/LSB radio check with IET560,IET561, ... (18Jul16) (AAI)
07594.5 IET59: Comando Arma Carabinieri Ascoli Piceno, I 0657 J3E/LSB calling IET32 (18Jul16) (AAI)
07610.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0734 (cf) FSK 100Bd/500 ACF =0 (20Jul16) (AAI)
07611.0 PY40: Algerian Mil, ALG 0552 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling FQ40 (20Jul16) (AAI)
07611.0 PY40: Algerian Mil, ALG 0554 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling FQ58 (20Jul16) (AAI)
07630.0 ---: Unid 0740 (cf) STANAG-4481, KG-84C encrypted message (20Jul16) (AAI)
07655.0 CNP: Roumenian Police, ROU 0612 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BU4 (20Jul16) (AAI)
07660.0 NE1: Unid net 0631 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling CO1 flwd by non-sense CW (prob. to wake-up) (20Jul16) (AAI)
07745.0 TBB: Turkish Navy, TUR 0520 USB STANAG-4285 600bps/L carbs "//TBB041 /TBB044 /TBB043 /TBB050 //" (20Jul16) (AAI)
08010.0 ---: Ukraine Mil, UKR 0608 USB MFSK-4 (double FSK) 96Bd 500Hz,(tones at -750, -250, +250, +750) (02Aug16) (AAI)
08040.0 LIS: 0609 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling WTF (03Aug16) (AAI)
08058.6 KWX59: US DoS Station 0610 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KWX57 (03Aug16) (AAI)
08070.0 ---: Unid 2112 USB Harris Analog Voice Scrambler (14Jul16) (AAI)
08086.5 IGSV: Italian Coast Guard, I 1200 USB/J3E calling ICI206 for radio check (31Jul16) (AAI)
08132.0 BP21: German Police vessel Bredstedt, D 2156 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshaking BPLEZS (14Jul16) (AAI)
08132.0 BPLEZS: German Police, D 0622 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BP24 (03Aug16) (AAI)
08190.0 RHN: Saudi AF Riyadh, ARS 2149 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling AAN (14Jul16) (AAI)
08421.0 WLO: USA Mobile Marine Radio Alabama, AL 0512 CW/ARQ "WLO" (22Jul16) (AAI)
08431.5 UAT: Moscow Radio, RUS CW/SiTOR id "DE UAT" (21Jul16) (AAI)
08494.9 S: MxBeacon "S" Sevastopol, UKR 2215 CW CW id "S" (21Jul16) (AAI)
08797.0 AA5: Israeli AF, ISR 2226 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (21Jul16) (AAI)
08797.0 AB3: (Israeli AF ?) 2228 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (21Jul16) (AAI) [1]
08819.0 ---:  Tashkent Meteo, UZB 2155 J3E/USB female speaker (14Jul16) (AAI)
08984.0 ---: Unid 1430 USB MIL 188-110 App.B msgs (14Jul16) (AAI)
09022.0 GS2: Nato32,RAF 8/54 Sqn, G 1446 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling XSS (14Jul16) (AAI) [1]
09022.0 XSS: UK DHFCS, G 1441 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE [CMD AMD][LIRN 141350Z 20009KT 160V230 9999 FE] (14Jul16) (AAI)
09088.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0557 USB AT-3004D modem, MPSK-12 120Bd BPSK (02Aug16) (AAI)
09652.0 RS002: Macedonian Mil, MKD 0706 USB MIL 188-110 ST carrying FED-1052 App.B, dest. CS001 (21Jul16) (AAI)
10182.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0555 USB AT-3004D modem, MPSK-12 120Bd BPSK (02Aug16) (AAI)
10523.0 ---: Russian Diplo/Intel, RUS 1405 CIS-3000 Serial after and before MFSK-68 transfer, CIS-3000 employed also as ALE or SelCall waveform? (14Jul16) (AAI)
12173.0 ---: Russian Intel/Diplo, RUS 0718 USB CIS-3000 ST flwd by OFDM 128-tones (64+64) 42Bd QPSK broadband waveform (18Jul16) (AAI)
12184.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS Moscow 0550 FSK 200Bd/500 Null message (28Jul16) (AAI)
12230.0 XKJ UK DHFCS, G 0851 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling XSS (30Jul16) (AAI)
12746.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0550 USB AT-3004D modem, MPSK-12 120Bd BPSK (02Aug16) (AAI)
12753.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0551 USB AT-3004D modem, MPSK-12 120Bd BPSK (02Aug16) (AAI)
13370.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0600 USB CIS-60 HDR modem OFDM 35.5Bd (28Jul16) (AAI)
13479.0 REA4: Russian Air Force, RUS 0540 (cf) CW FSK "... 999TT 3116T 23746 4576T 618T2 1T268 821T1=REA4 K" (02Aug16) (AAI)
13499.0 1102: Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC 0725 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (02Aug16) (AAI)
13527.9 S: MX Beacon "S" Severomorsk, Rus 1259 CW id (02Aug16) (AAI)
14150.0 ---: Norh Korean Diplo, DPRK 1325 LSB (cf -1500Hz) DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (aka Keguri) (02Aug16) (AAI)
14229.0 ---: Norh Korean Diplo, DPRK 1358 LSB (cf -1500Hz) DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (aka Keguri) (02Aug16) (AAI)
14444.0 ---: Norh Korean Diplo, DPRK 1325 LSB (cf -1500Hz) DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (aka Keguri) (02Aug16) (AAI)
14555.0 ---: Norh Korean Diplo, DPRK 1325 LSB (cf -1500Hz) DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (aka Keguri) (02Aug16) (AAI)
14641 : Enigma F01 1215 (cf) FSK 186.65Bd/500 sequence 00000++++++++++162)5761 (30Jul16) (AAI)
14650.0 ---: MFA Cairo, EGY 0710 USB (cf +1700Hz) SiTOR ARQ 100Bd/170 calling KKXU Egyptian embassy Harare or Accra (19Jul16) (AAI)
14777.0 ---: Norh Korean Diplo, DPRK 1325 LSB (cf -1500Hz) DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (aka Keguri) (02Aug16) (AAI)
14786.0 ---: Unid (prob. Bulgarian Diplo) 1140 USB USB RFSM-8000 modem with data-masking (27Jul16) (AAI)
14898.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0838 USB CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz modem (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (15Jul16) (AAI)
14925.0 ---: Egyptian Diplo, EGY 1332 USB SiTOR-A (cf + 1700) encrypted message to Al Manamha Bahrein, 196 groups  (02Aug16) (AAI)
14925.5 ---: no call (dest. address suggests Chinese net) 1433 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling A96 (18Jul16) (AAI)
15778.0 RCV: Russian Navy Sevastopol, UKR 0620 FSK 50Bd/200 (29Jul16) (AAI)
15927.3 ---: Unid 0920 USB STANAG-4285 600bps/L KG-84C encryption (24Jul16) (AAI)
15945.0 ---: Unid 0918 USB STANAG-4538 3G-ALE LDL traffic and ACK PDUs, HARRIS Citadel encryption (most likely HARRIS RF-5800H) (24Jul16) (AAI)
15980.0 ---: Unid (prob. Ukrainian net) 0540 USB T-207 5 of 6x100Bd/120Hz VFT system (20Jul16) (AAI)
16076.0 ---: Unid 1243 USB Link-11 CLEW (02Aug16) (AAI)
16103.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1305 USB CIS-45 OFDM HDR modem v2 BPSK 40Bd 62.5Hz (02Aug16) (AAI)
16116.5 OEY61: Austrian UNIFIL-Contingent in Naqoura, LBN (?) 1225 MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling OEY20 (02Aug16) (AAI)
16129.0 ---: Unid (prob. German Mil) 1210 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 serial 2400Bd PSK-8, ACF 106.66ms (02Aug16) (AAI)
16169.0 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 1159 USB Serdolik selcall flwd by Serdolik MFSK-34 40Bd 40Hz (aka Crowd-36) (02Aug16) (AAI)
16223.0 Russian Mil, RUS 1254 CW flash-message "XXX WEGI WEGI J45Ø2 T EOPGLK 667 6315 T" (01Aug16) (AAI)
16283.6 KSN21: US-Department of state 0604 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (29Jul16) (AAI)
16283.6 KWX57: US Dept of State station 0753 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KWS92 (03Aug16) (AAI)
16283.6 KWX57: US Dept of State station 0758 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KJA86 (03Aug16) (AAI)
16283.6 KWX57: US Dept of State station 0801 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling WNG767 (03Aug16) (AAI)
16283.6 KWX58: US DoS Station 0746 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KWX57 (02Aug16) (AAI)
16285.0 STAT11: Tunisian MOI net, TUN 1003 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE handshake with STAT151 flwd by PacTOR-II email "HF ARQ #STAT151" (22Jul16) (AAI)
16333.0 ---: Russian Diplo/Intel, RUS 0754 USB CIS-3000 serial modem PSK-8 3000Bd (01Aug16) (AAI)
16551.1 ---: Unid 0901 USB STANAG-4285 600bps/L, KG-84C encrypted messages (19Jul16) (AAI)
16730.0 AB3: (Israeli AF ?) 1222 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (02Aug16) (AAI)
16929.0 ---: (prob. WPG) 1300 USB "snake charmer" propagation measuring signal (02Aug16) (AAI)
17127.3 CTA:  NATO Lissabon (Monsanto), POR 1506 ISB/LSB STANAG-4285 600bps/L CARBs "1506Z//CTA02I/CTA08I/CTA12I/CTA14I/CTA16I/CTA19I//" (22Jul16) (AAI)
17314.0 ---: National Weather Serivice via USCG (NMN/NMC ?), US 2141 J3E/USB "Iron Mike"  Offshore forecasts and hurricane information (21Jul16) (AAI)
17422.0 Russian Mil, RUS 1244 USB CIS-112 OFDM 22.22Bd BPSK (01Aug16) (AAI)
17513.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1430 USB CIS-45 OFDM HDR modem v1 33.33Bd BPSK (21Jul16) (AAI)
17976.0 JDGSPR: USAF Diego Garcia SIPRNET access node, DGA 1510 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (22Jul16) (AAI)



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