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About CIS-3000, possibly a counterpart of NATO ALE ?

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The so-called CIS-3000 is a single 8-ary PSK-modulated 2000 Hz carrier (pic. 1) and it's nick name is just due to its constant 3000 symbols/sec waveform. This single-tone signal provides a teoric limit of max 9000 bit/sec and neeeds about 3300 Hz bandwidth.

pic.1 - main characteristics of CIS-3000
CIS-3000 is allegedly almost 100% of Russian origin and possibly used by Intel/Diplo agencies. It can be seen either as a continuous streamand as bursts,  and very often used before MFSK-68 and OFDM-128 "Corvette" modem transmissions (pic. 2).


pic. 2
The burst waveformhas been analyzedby radioscanner.ru friends and in this blog too; it is worth noting that in the analysis theradioscanner guys, mostly SergUA6, often use the terms "in this example only!" perhaps to draw attention to the existence of different CIS-3000 modes as, for example, the stream mode I heard and that is illustrated below in picture 3.
The first thing thatstrikes the eyeisa sort of well-definedstructure consisting of a preamble and data (say a superblock) that is repeated each ~3456 ms and indicated as "A" in pic. 3;in that same picture is also visible the repetition of the same structure "B" along the superblocks.

pic.3 - super-blocks and blocks repetitions

A more refinedmeasurement of thelengthof thesuperblock"A"is obtained by the demodulation of the signal and analyzing the resulting bistream: the length is 31104 bits or 10368 PSK-8 symbols (exactly 3456 ms, as a confirm of the precision of SA), as shown below in pic.4 where the number of the lines just match the number of the superblocks (unless the initial sync and the final trailer).

pic.4 - the same signal seen by the bitstream analyzer
Processing the CIS-3000 bistream returns a characteristic period of 5760 bits length, or 1920 PSK-8 symbols. Besides the period,  another interesting characteristic are the sequences of repeated data: as shown in pics. 5-6, the same sequences are repeated either along "B" blocks and "A" superblocks. This means that the system transmitscontiguous redundant informations (source and destination adresses?, commands?, controls?, ...), most likely to combat and reduce the effects of fading, interference, and noise.

pic.5
pic.6

Back to the burst mode, it's interesting to observe that this mode too has boththe same 5760 bits length structure and redundancy feature (pic. 7),  although the repetitions in this sample seem to be limited to 3 times and then less "aggressive". So, the 5760 bits period length and the redundancy are certain characterstics of CIS-3000, regardless the stream or the burst mode.

pic.7 - structure and redundancy of a CIS-3000 burst
By the way, since the lengths of a single burst and a superblock are pretty the same (pic. 8), the stream waveform could be thinked as a sequel of burst sent side by side (preambles included), but it's only a my speculation.

pic.8
The substantial redundant format adopted by the system, like MS188-141 or CODAN PSK-8 selcall, and its use before MFSK-68 and OFDM-128 modems,leads to think that the CIS-3000 could be used  as a selcallor a sort of CIS counterpart of the NATO ALE.

logs

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05410.0 4202: Sonatrach, ALG sounding 2116 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (02Mar16) (AAI)
05410.0 4245: Sonatrach, ALG sounding 2117 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (02Mar16) (AAI)
07607.0 ---: Unid 0922 AM 10 stepped tones (1 KHz increments, 1 sec step) from +1 Khz to +10 kHz (10Mar16) (AAI)
08850.0 SCPTOC: US Army Aviation, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo 0739 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (02Mar16) (AAI)
09115.0 E5X: Unid net 0911 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (10Mar16) (AAI)
09352.0 LIS: Unid net 0708 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling WTF (03Mar16) (AAI)
09352.0 LIS: Unid net 0726 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling XGY (08Mar16) (AAI)
09354.0 ---: Unid 0721 USB THALES Skymaster ALE flwd by voice comm (08Mar16) (AAI)
10185.0 S41: Moroccan Military, MRC 0700 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (02Mar16) (AAI)
10450.0 CENTR2: MFA Bucuresti, ROU 0801 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling YPM21 (03Mar16) (AAI)
10637.0 A15: Netherlands MIL, HOL 2106 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling A02 (02Mar16) (AAI)
10658.0 3014: Turkish red Crescent, TUR USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling 2014 (02Mar16) (AAI)
11168.6 KWS93: US Dept of State station 0827 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling KWT91 (10Mar16) (AAI)
11168.6 KWS99: US Dept of State station 0748 J3E/USB radio check with KWV71 US embassy Ankara "I have you the same" (10Mar16) (AAI)
11217.0 UKE303: RAF E-3 Awacs, G 0759 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (10Mar16) (AAI)
11217.0 XSS: DHFCS TASCOMM Forest Moor, G  0756 USB MIL 188-141 ALE AMD: "I HAVE SENT THEM TO YOU HAVE U NOT RX'D THEM KKKILO" (10Mar16) (AAI)
13547.1 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 1016 (cf) Serdolik OFDM 35-tone 40Bd BPSK flwd by MFSK-34 40Bd 40Hz (aka CROWD-36) (04Mar16) (AAI)
15871.5 ---: Unid 0853 USB THALES Skymaster ALE flwd by TRC-177x 2400Bd serial modem bursts (09Mar16) (AAI)
15945-0 ---: Unid 0958 USB THALES Skymaster ALE handshake flwd by TRC-177x 2400Bd serial modem (02Mar16) (AAI)
16112.0 1008: Unid presumed Iraqi Government net, IRQ 0902 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling 1001 (02Mar16) (AAI)
16112.0 1009: Mauritanian Gendarmerie, MTN 0804 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling 10010 (09Mar16) (AAI)
16216.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0935 USB CIS-3000 PSK-8 3000Bd serial flwd by MFSK-68 (04Mar16) (AAI)
16230.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0835 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (01Mar16) (AAI)
16230.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0850 USB CIS-3000 PSK-8 3000Bd serial, bursts (09Mar16) (AAI)
16240.0 08016: prob. Moroccan Police, MRC 0852 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (09Mar16) (AAI)
16240.0 1321: Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC 0850 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (09Mar16) (AAI)
16240.0 13262: Moroccan Police, MRC 0857 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (09Mar16) (AAI)
16240.0 2514: Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC 0851 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (09Mar16) (AAI)
16256.5 ---: Unid 0845 USB THALES Skymaster ALE flwd by TRC-177x 2400Bd serial modem bursts (09Mar16) (AAI)
16806.5 NRV: USCG Santa Rita, GU 1520 USB (f0 -1700 Hz) SiTOR FEC 100Bd/170 "Wind & Gale warnings" (07MAR16) (AAI)
16898.5 XSG: Shanghai radio, CHN 0900 (f0 -1700 Hz) SiTOR FEC 100Bd/170 sea conditions (07MAR16) (AAI)
16990.2 ---: Unid Chinese net 0914 (cf) "Chinese MFSK-64" 37.5Bd 37.5 Hz (07MAR16) (AAI)
17382.0 ---: Iranian Net 0802 (cf) Iranian QPSK, both 937.5Bd and 468.75Bd speeds (07MAR16) (AAI)
18554.5 OEY61: Austrian Military Lebanon 0735 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling OEY (10Mar16) (AAI)

 
16806.5 NRV: USCG Santa Rita, GU 1520 USB (f0 -1700 Hz) SiTOR FEC 100Bd/170

Sending files using MS188-110A and FED-STD 1052 App.B (H520) Data Link Protocol

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FED-STD-1052 Appendix B (FS-1052B) specifies a first generation Data Link Protocol (DLP) layer with priority messaging and multiple pre-emptive resume queuing ARQ (it is basically the equivalent of MS188-110A Serial Tone as to the modems). The FS-1052B HF DLP as designed will work with other data modems and not just the FS-1052 and MS110A ST modems, as in this sample. However FS-1052 it is optimized for use with a data modem having those same data rates from 75-2400bps and also supporting auto-baud.
FS-1052B provides three modes of operation:
ARQ modeThe primary mode of operation is the automatic repeat request (ARQ) mode, which provides for error-free point-to-point data transfer and
employ a control frame acknowledgment scheme.
Broadcast mode A secondary mode of operation is the Broadcast (non-ARQ) mode. The Broadcast mode allows unidirectional data transfer using fixed-length frames to multiple (as well as to single) receivers. No transmissions from the receiving terminal are desired or required.
Circuit modeThe other secondary mode, the Circuit mode, allows a link to be established and maintained in the absence of traffic. The ARQ variable-length frame protocol is used along with a technique to maintain the data link connection in the absence of user data.  


In the samples below, signals come from the real-world, for example the above picture  is related to a link between the callsigns BS008CB and CS003A: after the link setup, performed by MS188-141 2-G, they go into MS 188-110 for data transfer. 
After removed MS188-110A headers and other stuff (scramber, interleave and FEC coding) the resulting bistream exhibits a clear 520 bits period that is characteristic of FED-1052 App.B or H520 protocol (pic 2)


pic. 1 - over-the-air bitstream, as demodulated by SA

In the case shown in pic.2, the transmission is performed through an exchange of protocol frames so here we face the primary ARQ mode.

pic.2 - FS-1052B in ARQ mode
If the data are corrupted (strong fading, interferences, too weak signal,...) the analyzer will print out the "CRC Error" message, moreover the sessions should be taken from the beginning to the end since any lack of bits affects the integrity of the data.

pic. 3 - FS-1052B in Broadcast mode
Each new transmission begins with a three byte (24 bits) frame synchronization pattern to identify the following traffic as DLP processed traffic. The frame synchronization sequence in hexadecimal format is "5C5C5C". The sync pattern is transmitted such that the first eight bits in order of transmission are "00111010". Note: As shown here in transmission sequence, the left-most bits are the LSBs (pic. 4). If a transmission contains more than one frame, a two-byte sync sequence shall be inserted between each pair of adjacent frames, this pattern (hexadecimal) is "5C5C".

pic.4 - frame synchronization pattern
The Frame Header fields (consisting of the Sync Mismatch Bit and the Frame Type bit) and then Control Frame Header fields (pic. 5) follow the 3-byte sync pattern: their possible values and meanings are illustrated in paragraph 50.1.2 of "FS-1052: Letter of Promulgation" (see the link at the end).
 
pic.5 - Frame Header and Control Frame Header fields

In Broadcast mode (the receiver does not send acknowledgments) the transmit peer sends 520bits (or 65 bytes) fixed-length frames structured as (pic. 6):

a) 40-bits header
8-bits synchronization, depends on the communication line (observed patterns: "10010000", "10110000" 10001000");
8-bits descending counter indicating the frame number inside the block (pic. 7);
24-bits offset (in bytes) from the beginning of the message;
+
b) 448-bits information field;
+
c) 32-bits CRC field (computed over the preeceding 448-bits data).

pic.6 - 40 bits header
pic. 7 - the 8-bits descending counter
The information field can be obscured using cryptographic encoders such as KG-84A, KG-84C, KY-99, KY-57, KIV-7, KY-58 and  KY-68.

With this protocol, E-mail, files in MS-TNEF format, text messages, graphics extensions (TIF, GIF, JPG, BMP), Microsoft Word and Excel documents, Power Point presentations, PDF documents, HTML and other types of file can be transmitted: unfortunately, my analyzer does not have all handlers so, once removed FS-1052B protocol (pic. 8) the resulting stream/file may contain other protocols that will require further processing.
pic. 8 - after FS-1052B removal
FS-1052B is limited to a 2400bps maximum data rate by design, whereas the newer STANAG-5066 (second generation Data Link Protocol) has no such limitation.
An interesting  E-mail Performance comparison with 2nd and 3rd Generation Data Links protocols can be seen here (.pdf file).

About the user equipment, the popular Harris family of tactical HF radios includes models that implement a draft Proposed FS-1052B DLP (pFS-1052) they adopted and fielded years prior (!) to the published 1996 FS-1052 standard. So, more likely, the heard trasmissions just come from Harris tactical radios.

Links

Turkish Mil, FSK 600Bd/400Hz & 1200Bd/800Hz KG-84C

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weak signal heard on 10551.0 KHz/USB  0805z, variant of the more frequent 600Bd/400 reported here.


The low quality of my recordings does not allow its demodulation and then further investigations to check the presence of KG-84 encryption, anyway generally used in this kind of signals (FSK, both 600 and 1200 Baud speed). KarapuZ provided me a better quality recording so it was pretty easy to verify the KG-84 "flag"


Unid 5 x MFSK-16 20Bd 20Hz channels with BPSK 250Bd inserts

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this interesting signal has been heard on 13497.0 KHz and 15812.0 KHz USB on 30 October (from 1300z to 1330z) and on 15845.0 KHz USB on 18 March (from 1300z to 1320z).
The most interesting feature are the BPSK inserts, each 10 seconds, that modulate in turn 6 different 250 Hz spaced carriers at 250 symbols/sec. Apparently there isn't a certain order of choice of the six carriers or a sort of cycle so it's difficult to say something about the scope of these inserts. Since they do not carry informations, they could be sent for tuning filters and equalizing MFSK demodulator purposes, but it's only my guess.



About the MFSK part, it's possible to individuate five distinct MFSK-16 channels with tone separation of 20Hz and 20Bd speed, most likely the signal is a sort of FTD waveform. All the heard transmissions end with the same ~860 ms sequence  2 frequencies, modulated in some frequency time shifted method.




SYNC or ASYNC, that is the question

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(Hamlet, famous ancient prince and analyst)
Although a bitstream analyzer recognizes physical or data-link layer protocols by matching known patterns and sequences, it isn't source-coding aware then  in order to get something that makes sense is important to know if we face a synchronous or asynchronous mode. For example, my friend AngazU sent me a STANAG-4285 transmission which transports a Citadel encrypted file: 75bps speed and long interleave are the settings for its right decoding into an ASCII-bits file.
Looking at the graphic representation of the stream it's possible identify something like the characteristic pattern of Citadel... but  it isn't: there are some bits more. The reason is that that STANAG-4285 was in asynchronous mode with 8N1 framing: eight data bits, no parity bit, one start bit and one stop bit and then each character will betransmittedusinga total of10bits. This framingcould beguessedlooking at the period back from the analyzer: just ten bits (pic. 1).

Pic. 1
After removed both the start and the stop bits we get the clean 8-bit data and the Citadel pattern. It is worth nothing that processing the new stream, the analyzer easily detect the encryption (pic. 3).

Pic. 2
Pic. 3
The same issue may occur analyzing a Baudot (ITA-2) coded stream: five data bits, no parity bit, one start bit and two stop bit. The example is related to a STANAG-4285 transmission in clear text (no encryption and no re-protocolled) from French Navy FUG8. The bit analyzer correctly returns an 8-bit period and after removed the extra bits added by ITA-2 (1 bit start + 2 bits stop) we get the well-known text "VOYEZ VOUS LE BRICK..."

Pic. 4

Pic. 5
Then a big help comes from the period returned back from the analyzer: not always a stream is encrypted or looks not identifiable, sometimes it's only processed as synchronous when it's coded in async mode.

CIS 5 x MFSK-16 + BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem (II)

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Just to point out some interesting analogies with a similar MFSK-16 signal, heard in the latest days of the past September 2015.
That signal had the same MFSK parameters, 5 x 16 tones 10Bd 20Hz, but with FSK inserts each 10 seconds rather than the BPSK inserts seen in these days . SOM and EOM shows the same style. While the BPSK version has a fixed lenght of 21:05 minutes, the FSK version had a 33 seconds lenght and was repeated each 15 minutes.
One could say that the BPSK version seen in these days is a sort of evolution of the semptember FSK (test ?) version, but it's probably a speculation.

Japanese Military, MSK-30 +2 (mutichannel hybrid modem)

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For several days, at a frequency of 12384.0 and 16553.0 kHz on USB (16553.0 is a constant for the Japanese MIL 8 freq signal), we heard unmodulated carriers only, and then finally they went to the data! 
At a first glance the signal looks like an OFDM 32 tones, ~70Hz spaced and BPSK modulation at 50 Baud (pic.1). A separated unmodulated tone, the lower in the spectrum, acts as a pilot-tone for Doppler correction and is transmitted at a higher level that the other tones.
 
pic.1 - OFDM analysis
studying more carefully the individual tones and especially the first two tones in the lower part of the spectrum, the signal is not properly constructed with OFDM technology but rather is a multichannel waveform with a curious MSK modulation with 25 Hz shift and 50 Baud speed for what concerns the 30 highest channels.
Indeed, once isolated the higher tone, there is no evicence of carrier harmonics in the 2^ power and the phase detector shows a characteristic FSK-2 shape with 25Hz shift (pic.2).
 
pic.2 - absence of the carrier in the 2^ power harmonics
The 4-ary phase plane related to such channel reveals no diagonal transitions and two-state  transitions in Diff.1: signs of a MSK modulation (pic.3)
 
pic. 3
The highest 30 tones are then MSK 50Bd 25Hz shift, spaced by 70 Hz.
 
The two lower tones after the pilot exhibit a BPSK modulation, as revelaed by the presence of the carrier in the 2^ power harmonics: speed is 25 Baud for the first channel (pic. 4) and 50 Baud for the second one (pic. 5). It is worth noting that:
- the sequence "0101010101" which is transmitted with these two channels:  maybe for sync purposes,
- the 2 lower tones are tranmitted at a lower level that the upper 30 tones.
 
pic. 4 - the lower BPSK channel
pic. 5 - BPSK 50Bd in the second channel
Sumarizing the characteristics (pic. 6):
30 data-channels MSK 50Bd/25Hz, 25Hz spaced
2 service-channels BPSK 25 and 50 Baud, transmitted at lower level than the 30 upper tones
1 pilot-tone, transmitted at higher level that the 30 upper tones
 
pic.6
Both 16553.5 kHz USB and 12384.5 kHz USB was previously channels for the old Japanese 8-tone mode, probably a litlle mis-tuning.


logs

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02767.7 ---: Unid 2354 (cf) FSK 1200Bd/850 (19Mar16) (AAI)
08060.0 BS008CB: Macedonian Mil, MKD 0740 USB MIL 188-141 link setup with CS003A then into MIL 188-110A serial sending files via FED-1052 App.B ARQ mode (12Mar16) (AAI)
08174.0 AC01: Algerian Military, ALG 0857 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling XV01 (14Mar16) (AAI)
08987.7 MKL: NATO MATELO, Northwood Bcasts 1015 NATO-75 75Bd/850 KG-84C enctyption (20Mar16) (AAI)
09186.0 ---: 0921 USB STANAG-4538 BW3, BW4 waveforms (15Mar16) (AAI)
09300.0 ---: Unid (most likely Russian) 1432 USB MFSK-11 125Bd 250Hz, first tone +675Hz, ACF 792ms,  (23Mar16) (AAI)
09378.5 ---: Unid 0824 (cf +1500Hz on USB) R&S ALIS 228.65Bd/170 calling 220, rptd each ~3 mins (14Mar16) (AAI)
09906.0 ---: Unid NATO 0855 USB LINK-11 serial PSK-8 2400Bd (17Mar16) (AAI)
10156.5 OEY80: Austrian Mil. Villach, AUT 0948 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling OEY61 (11Mar16) (AAI)
10165.0 ---: Unid 0805 USB RFSM serial modem with Data Masking, QRX 10170.0 (11Mar16)
10211.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0725 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (16Mar16) (AAI)
10300.0 OEB: Algerian AF Oum El Bouaghi, ALG 0759 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling CM5 (15Mar16) (AAI)
10552.7 ---: Turkish Mil 0805 (cf) FSK-2 300Bd/400 & 1200Bd/800 (17Mar16) (AAI)
10958.0 ---: Unid 1503 USB STANAG-4538 BW3, BW4, BW5 waveforms, sending CITADEL encrypted file using LDL protocol (14Mar16) (AAI)
11056.0 P34: Unid (prob. Algerian AF) 0915 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (11Mar16) (AAI)
11081-0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0748 CIS-45 OFDM HDR modem v1 33.33Bd BPSK, many sessions (14Mar16) (AAI)
11106.0 EK9: Greek Military, GRC 0708 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling GEF (14Mar16) (AAI)
11464.5 ---: Unid NATO (Croughton? Akrotiri?) 1105 (cf) NATO-50 50Bd/850 (20Mar16) (AAI)
12155.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0715 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (16Mar16) (AAI)
12209.0 8451: TUR Turkish Civil Defense Manisa, TUR 0722 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (16Mar16) (AAI)
13454.0 ---: Unid (most likely Russian) 0836 CIS MFSK-11 125Bd 250Hz, first tone +685Hz ACF 792ms lasting 47 secs (16Mar16) (AAI)
14550.0 J62: Moroccan Military, MRC 0925 USB MIL 188-141 ALE sounding (21Mar16) (AAI)
14907.0 ---: prob. Russian Gov. 1330 CW "UEB UEB UEB QSY 12221T" (15Mar16) (AAI)
14908.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1320 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) (15Mar16) (AAI)
14936.0 ---: Russian Diplo 1310 (cf) prob. Serdolik selcall, MFSK-31 40Bd 40Hz sometimes seen preceeding Serdolik MFSK-34 (CROWD-36) transmissions (16Mar16) (AAI)
15822.5 ---: Unid 1240 AM 10 stepped tones (1 KHz increments, 1 sec step) from +1 Khz to +10 kHz (10Mar16) (AAI)
15824.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1340 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem, WWCR on 15825.0 AM (23Mar16) (AAI)
15864.0 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 0916 Serdolik OFDM 35-tone 40Bd 50Hz BPSK flwd by MFSK-34 (Crowd-36) (18Mar16) (AAI)
15956.5 ---: Australian MHFCS net 0900 (cf) GFSK 600Bd/340 (13Mar16) (AAI)
16227.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1040 USB CIS-112 OFDM 22.22Bd DBPSK (18Mar16) (AAI)
16240.0 2002: Unid (prob. Algerian Mil, ALG) 1015 USB MIL 188-141 ALE calling 1305 (17Mar16) (AAI)
16716.0 ---: Unid 0735 USB STANAG-4538 LDL-BW3 carrying Harris "Citadel" encrypted traffic + ACK packets (BW4) (22Mar16) (AAI)
17440.1 ---: Russian Diplo, RUS 0830 (cf) Serdolik MFSK-34 40Bd 40Hz (aka CROWD-36) (14Mar16) (AAI)
17459.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0930 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem (21Mar16) (AAI)
17928.0 017: ARINC Telde Gran canaria, CNR 1134 USB HFDL 300bps uplink to SU2406 (17Mar16) (AAI)
17967.0 015: ARINC Al Muharraq, BHR 1051 USB HFDL 300bps uplink to KC0881, RJ0821 (17Mar16) (AAI)
19356.0 ---: Unid 1305 USB THALES Skymaster ALE flwd by TRC-177x 2400Bd serial modem (15Mar16) (AAI)
19431.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1230 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem (21Mar16) (AAI)

 
USB MFSK-11 125Bd 250Hz, first tone +675Hz, ACF 792ms

SVO SiTOR-B: a curious feature

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SVO Olympia Radio (formerly SVA Athinai Radio) belongs to Hellenic Telecommunication Organization, S.A. (OTE) and is a telecommunications network that serves the needs of maritime security sector as well as the needs of commercial maritime communications  across the world.
At a first glance, its SiTOR-B broadcasts comply the standard 100Bd/170Hz that is common for such transmissions (pic.1) 

pic. 1
But looking closely at the signal there is a curious feature of the Sitor transmitter which is  evident in the oscillograms of the WF module (pic.2,3)
 
pic. 2
pic. 3
It is not clear what causes such behavior, if it's a requested feature or a transmitter "sign", anyway is present only in the Greek SVO SiTOR-B and in all theirSiTOR-B bands (8, 12, 16 and 22 MHz/USB).

unid FSK 100Bd/500, 40-bit (400ms) ACF

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16340.1 ---: Unid (prob. Russian) 1014 (cf) FSK-2 100Bd/500, strong ACF 400 ms (25Mar16) (AAI)
 


Probably an "old" RTTY transmitter sending the same pattern as a frequency marker.




CIS MFSK-68 (34+34): new tests?

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It seems that the CIS MFSK-68 protocol is constantly being modified and added new modulations. The "standard" waveform consists of 68 tones (2 x 34) 47 Hz spaced, each 1 second are sent 10Khz-wide PSK-8 9000Bd bursts (2 symbol element periods length) possibly acting as sync. Unlike normal MFSK (1 symbol = 1 tone) the signal uses 5-tones symbols so that its manipulation speed sums to 47Bd: 45 MFSK symbols + 2 PSK symbols.
On March 28th, at 1255 UTC, the signal has been heard on 14681.0 KHz/USB with an interesting variant consisting of "slots" with two tones, about 540 Hz and 2230 Hz,  with QPSK modulation and speed 47 symbols/sec. The QPSK tones are transmitted at a lower level than the MFSK tones.

pic.1
pic.2
In this sample, the "add" lasts 9 slots, each slot is 900ms length, and was seen at the start as well as during the heard transmissions. On January 15th (on 17514.0 KHz USB), has been heard a whole transmission consisting only of the variant. Demodulation reveals that the QPSK tones carry different data. 

pic.3
Don't know if these are test or sperimental transmissions, it is worth noting the constancy of the speed (47 Baud) and the reductions of tones during the 2-tones QPSK slots. Maybe further recordings of such wavforms could help.

unid 2400Bd PSK-2 burst waveform (SAT Telemetry downlink?)

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This signal was heard at 1245 UTC on 12168.0 KHz/USB on March 30th.
The burst waveform use a PSK-2 (prob. DBPSK) serial tone modulation of an 1800 Hz carrier at 2400 symbols per second (pics 1 and 2). Each transmission consists of 12 x 4000ms bursts, ending with a single 1500ms burst. 

pic. 1
pic. 2 - PSK-2 modulation of a 1800Hz carrier at 2400 Baud

Each 4000ms burst consists of 8 x 500ms frames (pic.3), for a total of9600 bits; ACF = 500ms/1200 bits (of course). 

pic. 3 - frame structure
Each 1200-bit frame is structured as a preamble followed by a67/134 bits period sub-frames, as shown in pictures 4 and 5 (the underlying sub-frames structure is also visible above in pic. 3).

pic. 4 - possible frame periods
pic. 5 - 1200 bit frame seen as a 134 bits period

Using a test-string such as "0011011000010101111"and synchronizing the stream on a 67-bit period, it's clearly visible that the burts send repetitive blocks of data
 
pic. 6 - 67-bit synchronized period

Such parameters (500 mS ACF, BPSK, 2400 Baud and repetitive blocks) are typical for SAT Telemetry downlink, my friend AngazU says. Searching the web I found that this mode is used by DELFI-N3XT cube-nano-picosat and cube-sat QB50. Downlink frequencies are planned on VHF 145 MHz so I don't know why 12168.0 KHz, maybe a relay for sporadic use... but who knows?

CIS-112 OFDM 22.22 Bd BPSK, stream-mode

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other than theπ/4 DQPSK burst mode, CIS OFDM 122-tone can be met also as a stream-waveform where all channels use BPSK modulation as part of the basic QPSK in the absolute constellation. The 22.22Bd manipulation speed and 25.6Hz channels separation are the same in both the two waveforms as well as the typical CIS pilot-tone transmitted at 3300 Hz from the suppressed carrier. This sample was recordered at 0940 UTC on 10980.0 KHz/USB (April, 3).

pic. 1 - CIS-112 BPSK stream-waveform

This CIS-112 waveform  has two functionally distinct transmission phases: synchronization preamble phase and data phase.
The duration of the sync preamble phase is 36 symbol periods and consists of  the 56 "odd"tones (pic. 2).During the sync phase the 3300Hz pilot-tone is transmited at a higher level. The preamble known-data seem to be modulated using QPSK modulation (pic. 3). 

pic. 2
pic. 3

During the data phase, the transmit waveform contains both message information and special symbols, say "probes", most likely reserved for equalization and sync by the receive modem. These probes are:
- a single special/service characterconsisting of the 56 odd tones, transmitted each 72 symbols 

pic. 4 - a special/service character is sent each 72 symbols
pic. 5 - the special/service symbol in the spectrogram
 
- a four symbol periods (181ms length) pattern transmitted each 144 symbols that causesstrong 6500ms ACF spikes. In my opinion this sequence consists of known-data and should work like the mini-probes of the MS188-110 serial waveforms.Looking at the spectrogram, it seems that only the 3rd symbolis transmitted at higher level.

pic. 6 - fours symbol periods pattern transmitted each 144 symbols
pic. 7 - 6500 ACF spikes

Is quite easy isolate a single channel and measure the manipulation speedbutit's very difficult to get the sub-carrier and consequently a clear phase constellation, despite the good quality of this sample (pic. 8). 
It's worth noting that some experts suggest that CIS-112 may use IOTA-OQAM technology and it causes intersymbolic-interference effects when analyzed with classical tools.
pic. 8
IOTA-OQAM technolgy 
http://signals.radioscanner.ru/base/signal229/
 

logs

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05824.0 HBM46: Swiss Military SUI 0645 VFT 2x 100Bd/170 (channels cf at -500, +500Hz) (08Apr16) (AAI)
06367.3 ---: Unid NATO 0650 NATO-50 50Bd/850 (08Apr16) (AAI)
06510.0 S1L: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0643 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling Z1V (08Apr16) (AAI)
07739.0 4050: Sonatrach, ALG 0655 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (01Apr16) (AAI)
07940.0 SL2: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0711 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling PO1 (01Apr16) (AAI)
08000.5 HFJCDRD1: Roumanian Mil, ROU 0702 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling HBLZDRD1 (01Apr16) (AAI)
08010.0 ---: Ukraine Mil, UKR 0650 (cf) MFSK-4 (double FSK) 100Bd 500Hz, (tones at -750, -250, +250, +750 Hz) (01Apr16) (AAI)
08162.0 UL01: Algerian Mil, ALG 0649 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling PY01 (01Apr16) (AAI)
08174.0 ND01: Algerian Mil, ALG 0820 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE three-way handshake with AC01 flwd by traffic in MIL 188-110A App.B 39-tone (01Apr16) (AAI)
08984.0 VH01: Algerian Mil, ALG 1153 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (30Mar16) (AAI)
09181.0 XS50: Algerian Mil, ALG 0812 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling XS54 (25mar16) (AAI)
09260.0 CM4: Algerian AF, ALG 0809 USB MIL 188-110 serial 150bps/short, Harris Citadel encrypted file to OEB (25mar16) (AAI)
09260.0 OEB: Algerian AF Oum El Bouaghi, ALG 0924 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling ESH (24Mar16) (AAI)
09300.0 ---: Unid (prob. Russian) 0845 USB MFSK-11 125Bd 250Hz, first tone +675Hz, ACF 792ms (long session, >1 hour) (24Mar16) (AAI)
09300.0 SNB813: Polish Mil, POL 0907 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SPT424 (24Mar16) (AAI)
09300.0 SPI324: Polish Mil, POL 0902 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling LCR154 (24Mar16) (AAI)
09628.0 ---: Russian Navy, RUS 0735 (cf) CIS-AKULA FSK 500Bd/1000 (25mar16) (AAI)
10185.0 J62: Moroccan Military, MRC 0723 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (08Apr16) (AAI)
10254.0 ---: Unid 0655 USB THALES Skymaster ALE flwd by TRC-177x 2400Bd serial modem (31Mar16) (AAI)
10450.0 CENTR2: MFA Bucuresti, ROU 0655 USB  MIL 188-141 2G-ALE, three-way handshake with YPM21 (31Mar16) (AAI)
10551.0 BS305A: Unid 1329 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BS310A (29Mar16) (AAI)
10980.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1135 USB CIS-112 OFDM 22.22Bd BPSK (31Mar16) (AAI)
12168.0 ---: Unid 1245 USB 2400Bd PSK-2 burst-waveform (30Mar16) (AAI)
12371.3 ---: no call 0723 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling HFJ (01Apr16) (AAI)
13373.0 ---: Russian Mil, 1137 USB CIS-45 OFDM HDR modem v2, 40 Bd p/4 DQPSK (06Apr16) (AAI)
13459.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1444 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) rptd at 1450z, both lasting 46sec. (05Apr16) (AAI)
14208.0 ---: Russian Navy, RUS 0737 (cf) CIS-Akula FSK 500Bd/1000 (02Apr16) (AAI)
14444.0 ---: Unid (prob. Egyptian MFA) 0809 USB CODAN-9001/3012 modem, MPSK-16 75Bd QPSK (06Apr16) (AAI)
14452.2 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0735 USB AT-3004D 12-tone modem BPSK 120Bd (06Apr16) (AAI)
14475.0 ---: Unid 0633 USB THALES Skymaster ALE Skyhopper mode (06Apr16) (AAI)
14489.5 ---: Unid (prob Russian Gov.) 0610 (cf) FSK 100Bd/2000 (30Mar16) (AAI)
14489.5 ---: Unid (prob Russian Gov.) 0615 (cf) CIS FSK 100Bd/2000 //14969.5, sign off 0700z (06Apr16) (AAI)
14508.0 5601: Iranian AF, IRN 1219 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling 20001 (02Apr16) (AAI)
14530.0 ---: North Korean Diplo, DPRK 0700 LSB DPRK-ARQ 600Bd/600 (06Apr16) (AAI)
14550.0 KB301: Unid (prob. Royal Moroccan Army) network 0853 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KB2 (06Apr16) (AAI)
14620.0 ---: MFA Cairo, EGY 0715 USB (cf +1700 USB) SiTOR-A 100Bd/170 selcal XBVF Madrid (06Apr16) (AAI)
14662.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1425 USB CIS-45 v1 OFDM 33.33Bd DBPSK bursts (01Apr16) (AAI)
14681.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1258 (cf + 2000Hz USB) MFSK-68(34+34), variant with two QPSK 47Bd tones (28Mar16) (AAI)
14780.0 ---: Russian Gov/Mil (?) 0740 (cf) Moroz-2, FSK 50Bd/500, not sending data (06Apr16) (AAI)
14796.0 ---: Unid (prob. Bulgarian Diplo) 0630 USB RFSM8000 modem, Data Masking (06Apr16) (AAI)
14796.0 ---: Unid (prob. Bulgarian Diplo) 1550 USB RFSM8000 modem, Data Masking (28Mar16) (AAI)
14801.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1046 USB CIS-3000 PSK-8 3000Bd serial flwd by MFSK-68 (05Apr16) (AAI)
14830.0 ---: Unid 0755 (cf) FSK 44.56bd/500, not sending data (06Apr16) (AAI)
14866.0 ---: Unid 0750 USB STANAG-4285 0745 USB 600bps/L (06Apr16) (AAI)
14976.0 ---: Russian AF, RUS 1310 (cf) FSK 50Bd/500 ACF 128 bits, sending repetitive data (31Mar16) (AAI)
15043.0 201073: USAF U-2s serial 80-1073 c/n 11-073 99th RS (Reconnaissance Sqdn), Beale AFB, CA USA 1350 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (24Mar16) (AAI)
15043.0 ADW: USAF Andrews AFB, USA 1353 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (24Mar16) (AAI)
15801.0 ---: Unid (Chinese V22 ?) 1420 (cf) BPSK 63Bd encrypted (24Mar16) (AAI)
15901.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1330 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem (24Mar16) (AAI)
16098.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1300 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem (26Mar16) (AAI)
16103.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 1408 CIS-112 OFDM 22,22 Bd BPSK bursts (06Apr16) (AAI)
16117.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 1407 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem, off 1411z (28Mar16) (AAI)
16340.1 ---: Unid (prob. Russian) 1014 (cf) FSK-2 100Bd/500 ACF 400 ms (25Mar16) (AAI)
17459.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0930 (cf + 1600Hz USB) 5 x MFSK-16 10Bd 20Hz BPSK 250Bd Hybrid modem (25Mar16) (AAI)



odd CRC error (in a good signal)

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Some days ago, just to spend some time, I was listening to  loud and clear HFDL messages exchanged between the ARINC ground station of Al Muharraq and some aircrafts. No problems for decoding all the messages but one of these failed due to a CRC error. Fortunately I was recording the IQ signal so I decided to undertand the reason of that CRC error, since the received signals were very good indeed.
Once isolated and demodulated the error burst I opened the resulting bitstream in order to verify the HFDL Physical layer protocol (PPDU) structure and it was ok. As expected: 25ms frame length corresponding to a 45 symbols frame for the data-segment, thirty of which are information-carrying (user data) symbols and fifteen are known 2-PSK probe symbols. I also detected the "T" string (000 100 110 101 111 repeated 9 times) closing the  preamble-segment (pics 1,2).

pic. 1 - PPDU structure
pic. 2 - bistream of the error burst after demodulation
From a certain point onwards the bistream shows a repeated regular pattern in the data field (pic. 3). The length of this repeated pattern is 120 bit: just as the legth of the PPDU scrambler (pic. 4). This could mean that there is no phase changes in the user-data or no data at input and in this situation the FEC decoder reveals errors in CRC computing.

Pic. 3
Pic. 4

Nokia Adaptive MSG-Terminal, FSK 301Bd/780

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heard this morning (April, 13) on 10226.8  KHz (cf) at 0814 UTC: only one transfer, maybe due to bad propagation? Signal is an FSK-2 modulation at 301 Baud and 780 Hz shift (pic. 1), most likely from Finnish Intelligence.
Pic. 1
The signal is chacterized by several harmonics (pic. 2) and is suggested to be originated from a Nokia Adaptive MSG Terminal, as reported in two interesting topics from radioscanner forum:
The former just refers to this waveform while the latter refers to the M85200 M/90 Nokia Adaptive MSG Terminal:  the heard signal is probably a new variant/modem.
A possible period length is 16 bit (pic. 3) but since this modem uses the Manchester coding the source stream has a 8 bit period.

Pic. 3
Pic. 4

MS188-110C App.D waveform 0 (Walsh) and 7 (PSK-8)

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Both the two signals A and B have the same duration and both have a long preamble-segment followed by the data-segment. The signals spread ~3KHz bandwidth and consist of a 1800Hz carrier with PSK-8 modulation at 2400 symbols/sec.

synchronization preamble segment
From MS188-110C App.D "The synchronization preamble is used for rapid initial synchronization and provides time and frequency alignment. The synchronization preamble shall consist of two main sections, a transmitter level control (TLC) settling time section, and a synchronization section containing a repeated preamble super-frame. The preamble super-frame consists of three distinct subsections, one with a fixed (known) modulation, one to convey a downcount, and one to convey waveform identification." The superframe shall be repeated M times. The Synchronization section shall be immediately followed by the modulated data (pic 1).

Pic. 1
Both the two sync preamble segments have the same lenght (~ 5 seconds) and the same ACF structure: 239.98 ms frame that makes 576 symbols or 1728 bits
From the 188-110C App.D documentation, the orthogonal Walsh modulation is used in the synchronization section of the preamble and the length of the super-frame is 18 channel-symbols, ie: 
9 (fixed) + 4 (downcount) + 5 (waveform identification)  
Since in 3KHz bandwidth waveforms the preamble channel-symbol is 32 symbol length (pic. 2), the length of each repeated superframe is: 18 (channel-symbols) x 32 (length of one channel-symbol) that makes the measured 576 symbols or 1728 bits (pic. 3). 

Pic. 2
Pic. 3
That's ok in pic.4, where the synchronizationsection of the two preambles exhibits a clear 1728 bit period length.

Pic. 4
data segment
The data segments have the same lenghts but different frame structures (pic. 5).
 
Pic. 5 - over-the-air bitstreams after removed the sync preamble

The frame structure for the signal-A waveform is the one shown in figure D-7 of Appendix D: the initial synchronization preamble is followed by frames of alternating data (unknown-data) and probe symbols (known-data):
 
After demodulating the signal, the bistream analysis reveals a 288 symbols  or 864 bits length frame consisting of 256 unknown-data + 32 known-data (96 bits probe):  it's the waveform ID-7 of the 3KHz bandwidth set (pic. 6)

Pic. 6a - WID-7 frame structure

Pic. 6b - WID-7 32 known-data (96 bits probe)

The signal-B waveform does not exhibit a data+probe structure but rather strong 853.4ms ACF spikes (pic. 7) that makes 2048 symbols/sec at 2400Bd speed or 6144 bits.  The signal B is the waveform ID-0, using a different structure after the synchronization preamble: data “frames” are 32-symbol Walsh sequences (channel symbols), each corresponding to a single unknown (data) bit.

Pic. 7 - 2048 symbols ACF (~853.4ms) for the signal B

As shown in pic. 8 (after demodulating the signal-B) mini-probes are not sent in waveform 0, Walsh-coded data symbols are sent continuously after the initial synchronization preamble and the 2048 symbols (6144 bit) period is due to the scrambler lenght. For waveform 0 the data scrambling implementation just generates 256 x 8 or 2048 values and the scrambling sequences are continuously wrapped around the 2048 symbol boundary. Athough data are modulated using Walsh ortogonal modulation, they are scrambled to appear, on-air, as an 8PSK constellation.

Pic. 8 - WID-0 6144 bit period caused by the scrambler lenght

email over HF using STANAG-5066 DTS: a more interesting example

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This recording is another example of sending compressed e-mail file using STANAG-5066DTS and the MS188-110A serial waveform as "carrier" at physical layer: while the previous recording was relative to Polish Military, the present one concerns a BFTP transfer over HF link between two peers of Romanian MAECT - Minister of Foreign Affairs (...which surely use Harris hardware/software equipments). The transfer was heard on 10315.0 KHz/USB on 18 Apr, starting from 0756 UTC.

STANAG 5066 (Profile for HF Radio Data Communication) is a NATO protocol stack definition operated over HF modem/radio equipment. S5066 provides standard clients over SIS (Subnetwork Interface Sublayer) and an IP mapping/adaptation in order to make use of conventional IP applications over HF radio band in a transparent way. There exist three editions of S5066 specification. Edition 1, and Edition 2 radios do not attempt to transmit when it is known that another radio is transmitting. It means that the data exchange is node to node and no more than two peers may communicate at the same time. With the release of S5066 Edition 3, this problem was resolved by using CSMA and HFTRP methods. The DTS (Data Transfer Sublayer) are same for Edition 1 and 2, the  CSMA and HFTRP new features was added to DTS layer of Edition 3 maintaing backward compatibility with the 1,2 editions. 

I used k500 decoder to demodulate the heard transmissionsand then passed to the analysis of the obtained bitstream, once removed the 188-110 overhead.

188-110 over-the-air symbols
 Since S5066 is a "protocol stack", it has up to eight different Packet Data Units (PDUs) available and then analyzing a S-5066 transfer we could face different packet lenghts as in a wireshark capture example in pic. 1
 
Pic. 1 - some S5066_DTS PDU types

Although the DATA_ONLY PDU (222 byte, or 1776 bit period) is the more often met, this sample is interesting since exhibits pronounced 29 byte (or 232 bit) period mostly due to the EXP_NON_ARQ_DATA PDUs in the last two 2400bps/L 188-110 messages (pic. 2).  The DATA_ONLY (1776 bit) is clearly visible analyzing the PDU in the first 1200bps/short 188-110 message (pic. 3).
 
Pic. 2 - 29 byte = 232 bit period mostly due to  PDU type 8: EXP_NON_ARQ_DATA

Pic. 3 - 222 byte = DTS PDU type 0: DATA_ONLY
 It's interesting to note in pic. 4 that all the four S5066 PDUs have the same pattern:

Pic. 4
I just focused on the first 1200bps/S 188-110 message since it's the one that just contains a valid DATA_ONLY PDU.
The presence of the file HBFTP--1.gz  into the bitstream after S5066 PDU-0 removal (pic. 5), reveals that the data transfer is performed using a compressed file and Basic File Transfer Protocol (BFTP): in this case the used protocol is HBFTP that stands for Harris BFTP.


Pic. 5 - the compressed file HBFTP--1
The Basic File Transfer Protocol (BFTP) is a very simple protocol (based on the ZMODEM protocol) and is not designed to be especially robust. It's used in conjunction with CFTP (and obviously S5066) to forward e-mails over HF links. Messages produced by an e-mail application are  compressed in CFTP, segmented in the S5066 Basic File Transfer Protocol (BFTP), and passed to the S5066 DTS.At the receiving node, this process is reversed, and the uncompressed e-mail message is delivered to the receiving e-mail applicationfor delivery or forwarding (pic. 6)

Pic. 6 - S5066 as a "connecting link" between wired and HF networks

It's worth noting that S5066 may use two top protocols named RCOP (Reliable Connection Oriented Protocol) and UDOP (Unreliable Datagram-Oriented Protocol) which are the HF equivalents of the well-known TCP and UDP protocols used in wired (inter)networks. In a few words, S5066 is a sort of "Middle-Earth"between wired and HF network... but that's another story.

Back to the received BFTP file, once decompressed we get the original e-mail message (pic 7,8): it's a simple and nice test message that in my opinion can be safely shown because it's a not a "suepr secret" message  but just a simple e-mail "chat" between operators (I only obscured part of the involved addresses): they know what are doing when send clear text.

Pic. 7
Pic. 8
For nosey people, it's also possible to understand that "HARRIS2" uses HP computer (look at "...Received: from hp3254104...").

logs

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05320.0 ---: Unid 0621 USB STANAG-4197 (08Apr16) (AAI)
07102.0 9A0MIL: Global ALE HF Network Zagreb, HRV 0613 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (15Apr16) (AAI)
08010.0 ---: Ukraine Mil, UKR 0620 (cf) MFSK-4 (double FSK) 100Bd 500Hz, (tones at -750, -250, +250, +750 Hz) (19Apr16) (AAI)
08132.0 BP21: German Police vessel Bredstedt, D 0632 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BPLEZS (19Apr16) (AAI)
08132.0 BP25: German Police vessel Bayreuth, D 0634 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling BPLEZS (19Apr16) (AAI)
09239.8 ---: Unid 0815 (cf) FSK 100Bd/1000 not sending data (08Apr16) (AAI)
10170.0 OCI: Slovakian Mil, SVK 0643 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SIP (13Apr16) (AAI)
10226.8 ---: Unid (prob Finnish Intel) 0814 (cf) Nokia MSG-Terminal FSK 301Bd/780 (13Apr16) (AAI)
10246.0 F11: Polish intel, POL 0700 USB  POL-FSK 100Bd/740 (22Apr16) (AAI)
10275.0 4236: Sonatrach, ALG 0730 LSB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Apr16) (AAI)
10315.0 ---: MAECT Bucuresti, ROM 0756 USB MIL 188-110 serial carrying zipped test email via STANAG-5066 HBFTP client (18Apr16) (AAI)
10315.0 ---: Unid (prob. NATO station) 0650 USB MIL 188-110 Serial carrying KG-84 encrypted data (13Apr16) (AAI)
10333.0 RCI: Saudi Air Force, ARS 1622 ISB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling NAI (13Apr16) (AAI)
10417.5 B10: Ukrainian x10 net, UKR 1353 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Apr16) (AAI)
10417.5 C10: Ukrainian x10 net, UKR 1601 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Apr16) (AAI)
10417.5 J10: Ukrainian x10 net, UKR 1623 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Apr16) (AAI)
10569.7 RFAL4: Unid net 1611 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling RFAL2 (13Apr16) (AAI)
10658.0 4017: Turkish red crescent TUR 0701  USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling 3010 (22Apr16) (AAI)
10668.0 ---: Unid 0702 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 ALE burst (22Apr16) (AAI)
10677.0 RHI: Saudi Air Force, ARS 1628 ISB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling AAI (13Apr16) (AAI)
10724.0 ---: Iranian net, IRN 1557 (cf) Iranian-QPSK 468.75Bd (13Apr16) (AAI)
10729.0 ---: Unid (prob. V22) 1230 (cf) PSK-2 62.5Bd, 3 mins lasting (20Apr16) (AAI)
10750.0 GANOB1: GMRA net, LYB 1614 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling HQ1 (13Apr16) (AAI)
10750.0 GANOB10: GMRA net, LYB 1614 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling HQ1 (13Apr16) (AAI)
10786.0 ---: Unid 1545 USB STANAG-4197 modem (13Apr16) (AAI)
10790.0 152: Unid net 1615 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (13Apr16) (AAI)
10888.0 ---: Russian Navy, RUS 0705 (cf) CIS-Akula FSK 500Bd/1000 bursts (22Apr16) (AAI)
10980.0 ---: Chinese Mil, CHN 1617 LSB Chinese OFDM 30-tone bursts (13Apr16) (AAI)
11010.0 ---: Unid 0810 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 ALE burst (22Apr16) (AAI)
12394.0 ---: Unid 0746 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 ALE burst (22Apr16) (AAI)
12736.0 ---: Unid (prob Russian AF) 0620 (cf) FSK 100Bd/800 not sending data (13Apr16) (AAI)
12935.0 HLG: Seoul Radio, KOR 1455 CW "CQ de HLG QSX 12 MHz K" (09Apr16) (AAI)
13499.0 1114: Unid (prob. Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC) 1433 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (09Apr16) (AAI)
13514.0 ---: Israeli Navy, ISR 1440 USB hybrid HF modem (09Apr16) (AAI)
13538.0 ---: Russian Mil, RUS 0640 USB CIS-45 OFDM HDR modem_v2 40Bd BPSK (19Apr16) (AAI)
14421.0 BAL: Algerian AF, ALG 0823 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling CM3 (21Apr16) (AAI)
14489.5 ---: Unid (prob Russian Gov.) 0615 (cf) FSK 100Bd/2000 (13Apr16) (AAI)
14590.0 ---: Unid 0915 USB Arcotel MAHRS-2400 ALE burst (09Apr16) (AAI)
14672.0 ---: Russian Navy, RUS 0803 USB AT-3004D modem + CW opchat on 2^ channel "QRJ ? K""QJB3 K" (09Apr16) (AAI)
14925.0 ANK: Finland MFA (prob. Embassy Ankara, TUR) 1147 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling HKI2 Helsinki (14Apr16) (AAI)
14925.0 HKI2: Finland MFA Helsinki, FNL 1143 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling ANK (prob. Embassy Ankara) (14Apr16) (AAI)
14925.0 HKI3: Finland MFA Helsinki, FNL 1209 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling ANK (prob. Embassy Ankara) flwd by SKY-OFDM 22-tone data (14Apr16) (AAI)
16161.0 5601:  Iranian AF, IRN 0936 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling 20001 (15Apr16) (AAI)
16175.0 ---: Russian AF, RUS 0700 USB VFT 3 x 100Bd/1450 + extra tone at ~3440Hz (pilot?) (19Apr16) (AAI)
16230.0 ---: Russian Intel, RUS 0830 (cf) CIS FTM-4, MFSK-4 150Bd (effective 37.5Bd) 4000Hz (tones at: -6, -2, +2, +6 KHz) 8 minutes lasting (22Apr16) (AAI)
16240.0 1326: Unid (prob.  Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC) 0811 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE sounding (21Apr16) (AAI)
16283.6 KVX53: US Dept of State station 0802 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KVX51 (21Apr16) (AAI)
16283.6 KVX53: US Dept of State station 0818 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KVX99 (21Apr16) (AAI)
16468.1 PHR: Unid network 0717 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SHL (21Apr16) (AAI)
16468.1 PHR: Unid network 0725 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GUN (21Apr16) (AAI)
16468.2 GUC: Unid network 1559 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SHL (15Apr16) (AAI)
16468.2 GUN: Unid network 1304 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling SHL (15Apr16) (AAI)
16468.2 GUN: Unid network 1310 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling PHR (15Apr16) (AAI)
16468.2 PHR: Unid network 1313 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling GUN (15Apr16) (AAI)
16766.5 ---: Unid 1340 (cf +1500Hz USB) SiTOR-A 100Bd/170 "538678 STRN XTEST+ TST+TEST" (17Apr16) (AAI)
17415.0 ---: MFA Cairo, EGY 1325 USB (cf +1700 USB) SiTOR-A 100Bd/170 calling IPTX Havana (08Apr16) (AAI)
17912.0 014: ARINC Krasnoyarsk, RUS 1209 USB HFDL, working flight UP0003 (10Apr16) (AAI)
18350.0 LEB: Unid network 0702 USB MIL 188-141 2G-ALE calling KUL (15Apr16) (AAI)


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